International mediation efforts led by the Quad (United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE) have centered on a proposed three-month humanitarian truce followed by a political process toward civilian governance, with the RSF indicating acceptance in late 2025 while the SAF has rejected terms citing external bias and demanding RSF withdrawal from contested areas. Sudanese authorities advanced their own monitored ceasefire proposal in December 2025, which the RSF dismissed. Battlefield dynamics show the SAF consolidating gains in central regions including Khartoum, while the RSF maintains control in much of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and renewed drone strikes on El Obeid in August 2026. A July 2026 court ruling in Port Sudan sentencing RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to death for war crimes has further complicated direct talks. Persistent external arms flows, mutual distrust, and the absence of enforceable monitoring mechanisms continue to limit near-term de-escalation prospects despite repeated calls from the AU, UN, and Quintet partners.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Cese al fuego de la guerra civil de Sudán por...?
$106,299 Vol.
31 de diciembre de 2026
15%
$106,299 Vol.
31 de diciembre de 2026
15%
If the agreement is officially reached before the resolution date, this market will resolve to "Yes," regardless of whether the ceasefire officially starts afterward.
Any form of informal agreement will not be considered an official ceasefire. Humanitarian pauses will not count toward the resolution of this market.
A peace deal or political framework will qualify if it includes a publicly announced and mutually agreed halt in military engagement, effective on a specific date. Frameworks or agreements that outline terms for a future peace but do not include an explicit, dated commitment to stop fighting will not count.
This market's resolution will be based on official announcements from both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces; however, a wide consensus of credible media reporting stating an official ceasefire agreement between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces has been reached will suffice.
Mercado abierto: Dec 22, 2025, 2:08 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...If the agreement is officially reached before the resolution date, this market will resolve to "Yes," regardless of whether the ceasefire officially starts afterward.
Any form of informal agreement will not be considered an official ceasefire. Humanitarian pauses will not count toward the resolution of this market.
A peace deal or political framework will qualify if it includes a publicly announced and mutually agreed halt in military engagement, effective on a specific date. Frameworks or agreements that outline terms for a future peace but do not include an explicit, dated commitment to stop fighting will not count.
This market's resolution will be based on official announcements from both the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces; however, a wide consensus of credible media reporting stating an official ceasefire agreement between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces has been reached will suffice.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...International mediation efforts led by the Quad (United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE) have centered on a proposed three-month humanitarian truce followed by a political process toward civilian governance, with the RSF indicating acceptance in late 2025 while the SAF has rejected terms citing external bias and demanding RSF withdrawal from contested areas. Sudanese authorities advanced their own monitored ceasefire proposal in December 2025, which the RSF dismissed. Battlefield dynamics show the SAF consolidating gains in central regions including Khartoum, while the RSF maintains control in much of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and renewed drone strikes on El Obeid in August 2026. A July 2026 court ruling in Port Sudan sentencing RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to death for war crimes has further complicated direct talks. Persistent external arms flows, mutual distrust, and the absence of enforceable monitoring mechanisms continue to limit near-term de-escalation prospects despite repeated calls from the AU, UN, and Quintet partners.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado



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