The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained institutional cohesion and military backing amid intensified U.S. fuel sanctions and an oil blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan supplies. In response, Cuban authorities passed sweeping economic reforms in June 2026 to expand private sector roles, attract investment, and decentralize elements of administration, signaling adaptive measures rather than breakdown. Sporadic protests tied to blackouts and shortages have occurred but remain contained through security forces, consistent with the regime’s record of managing dissent and economic strain without systemic collapse. Traders pricing “No” at 88% reflect this demonstrated resilience and the absence of conditions—such as coordinated opposition mobilization or elite fractures—sufficient to trigger regime change by year-end.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourLe régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Le régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Oui
12% chance
$1,624,340 Vol.
$1,624,340 Vol.
30 déc. 2026
Oui
12% chance
$1,624,340 Vol.
$1,624,340 Vol.
30 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained institutional cohesion and military backing amid intensified U.S. fuel sanctions and an oil blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan supplies. In response, Cuban authorities passed sweeping economic reforms in June 2026 to expand private sector roles, attract investment, and decentralize elements of administration, signaling adaptive measures rather than breakdown. Sporadic protests tied to blackouts and shortages have occurred but remain contained through security forces, consistent with the regime’s record of managing dissent and economic strain without systemic collapse. Traders pricing “No” at 88% reflect this demonstrated resilience and the absence of conditions—such as coordinated opposition mobilization or elite fractures—sufficient to trigger regime change by year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volume
$1,624,340Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained institutional cohesion and military backing amid intensified U.S. fuel sanctions and an oil blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan supplies. In response, Cuban authorities passed sweeping economic reforms in June 2026 to expand private sector roles, attract investment, and decentralize elements of administration, signaling adaptive measures rather than breakdown. Sporadic protests tied to blackouts and shortages have occurred but remain contained through security forces, consistent with the regime’s record of managing dissent and economic strain without systemic collapse. Traders pricing “No” at 88% reflect this demonstrated resilience and the absence of conditions—such as coordinated opposition mobilization or elite fractures—sufficient to trigger regime change by year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$1,624,340Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...The Cuban Communist Party leadership under Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained institutional cohesion and military backing amid intensified U.S. fuel sanctions and an oil blockade imposed since January 2026, following the cutoff of Venezuelan supplies. In response, Cuban authorities passed sweeping economic reforms in June 2026 to expand private sector roles, attract investment, and decentralize elements of administration, signaling adaptive measures rather than breakdown. Sporadic protests tied to blackouts and shortages have occurred but remain contained through security forces, consistent with the regime’s record of managing dissent and economic strain without systemic collapse. Traders pricing “No” at 88% reflect this demonstrated resilience and the absence of conditions—such as coordinated opposition mobilization or elite fractures—sufficient to trigger regime change by year-end.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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