**The Cuban regime's institutional cohesion under Miguel Díaz-Canel and the Communist Party has so far withstood intensified U.S. maximum-pressure measures, including the January 2026 fuel blockade and subsequent sanctions on state energy, mining, and military-linked firms.** These steps followed the U.S. ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and cut off critical oil supplies, triggering nationwide blackouts, tourism collapse, and economic strain. Yet the Revolutionary Armed Forces and internal security structures have contained protests and prevented elite fractures or viable transition pathways. Cuba has responded with limited economic adjustments—such as expanded private-sector roles in tourism, land use, and fuel imports—while rejecting broad privatization. U.S. intelligence assessments and independent analyses highlight the regime’s historical resilience and the absence of conditions for rapid collapse by year-end. Traders therefore assign the high “No” probability, viewing sustained attrition as more likely than outright regime change in 2026.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · ОбновленоПадение кубинского режима в 2026 году?
Падение кубинского режима в 2026 году?
Да
13% вероятность
$1,628,673 Объем
$1,628,673 Объем
30 дек. 2026 г.
Да
13% вероятность
$1,628,673 Объем
$1,628,673 Объем
30 дек. 2026 г.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**The Cuban regime's institutional cohesion under Miguel Díaz-Canel and the Communist Party has so far withstood intensified U.S. maximum-pressure measures, including the January 2026 fuel blockade and subsequent sanctions on state energy, mining, and military-linked firms.** These steps followed the U.S. ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and cut off critical oil supplies, triggering nationwide blackouts, tourism collapse, and economic strain. Yet the Revolutionary Armed Forces and internal security structures have contained protests and prevented elite fractures or viable transition pathways.
Cuba has responded with limited economic adjustments—such as expanded private-sector roles in tourism, land use, and fuel imports—while rejecting broad privatization. U.S. intelligence assessments and independent analyses highlight the regime’s historical resilience and the absence of conditions for rapid collapse by year-end. Traders therefore assign the high “No” probability, viewing sustained attrition as more likely than outright regime change in 2026.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Открытие рынка: Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Объем
$1,628,673Дата окончания
31 дек. 2026 г.Открытие рынка
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**The Cuban regime's institutional cohesion under Miguel Díaz-Canel and the Communist Party has so far withstood intensified U.S. maximum-pressure measures, including the January 2026 fuel blockade and subsequent sanctions on state energy, mining, and military-linked firms.** These steps followed the U.S. ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and cut off critical oil supplies, triggering nationwide blackouts, tourism collapse, and economic strain. Yet the Revolutionary Armed Forces and internal security structures have contained protests and prevented elite fractures or viable transition pathways.
Cuba has responded with limited economic adjustments—such as expanded private-sector roles in tourism, land use, and fuel imports—while rejecting broad privatization. U.S. intelligence assessments and independent analyses highlight the regime’s historical resilience and the absence of conditions for rapid collapse by year-end. Traders therefore assign the high “No” probability, viewing sustained attrition as more likely than outright regime change in 2026.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Объем
$1,628,673Дата окончания
31 дек. 2026 г.Открытие рынка
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**The Cuban regime's institutional cohesion under Miguel Díaz-Canel and the Communist Party has so far withstood intensified U.S. maximum-pressure measures, including the January 2026 fuel blockade and subsequent sanctions on state energy, mining, and military-linked firms.** These steps followed the U.S. ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and cut off critical oil supplies, triggering nationwide blackouts, tourism collapse, and economic strain. Yet the Revolutionary Armed Forces and internal security structures have contained protests and prevented elite fractures or viable transition pathways. Cuba has responded with limited economic adjustments—such as expanded private-sector roles in tourism, land use, and fuel imports—while rejecting broad privatization. U.S. intelligence assessments and independent analyses highlight the regime’s historical resilience and the absence of conditions for rapid collapse by year-end. Traders therefore assign the high “No” probability, viewing sustained attrition as more likely than outright regime change in 2026.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
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