Intensified U.S. sanctions targeting Cuba’s military-linked economic conglomerate GAESA, combined with an oil blockade following the January 2026 removal of Venezuela’s Maduro, have deepened fuel shortages, blackouts, and economic contraction on the island. Despite mounting protests, record emigration, and public displays of defiance during May Day events, the Cuban government has preserved institutional control through its security apparatus, limited prisoner releases, and selective engagement with foreign suppliers such as Russia. Recent high-level contacts, including the CIA director’s May 14 visit conveying demands for fundamental reforms, signal ongoing diplomatic pressure rather than imminent collapse. Traders assess these factors as supporting regime endurance through 2026, consistent with the 71.5% implied probability on “No.”
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourLe régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Le régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Oui
$252,724 Vol.
$252,724 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
Oui
$252,724 Vol.
$252,724 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Intensified U.S. sanctions targeting Cuba’s military-linked economic conglomerate GAESA, combined with an oil blockade following the January 2026 removal of Venezuela’s Maduro, have deepened fuel shortages, blackouts, and economic contraction on the island. Despite mounting protests, record emigration, and public displays of defiance during May Day events, the Cuban government has preserved institutional control through its security apparatus, limited prisoner releases, and selective engagement with foreign suppliers such as Russia. Recent high-level contacts, including the CIA director’s May 14 visit conveying demands for fundamental reforms, signal ongoing diplomatic pressure rather than imminent collapse. Traders assess these factors as supporting regime endurance through 2026, consistent with the 71.5% implied probability on “No.”
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volume
$252,724Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Intensified U.S. sanctions targeting Cuba’s military-linked economic conglomerate GAESA, combined with an oil blockade following the January 2026 removal of Venezuela’s Maduro, have deepened fuel shortages, blackouts, and economic contraction on the island. Despite mounting protests, record emigration, and public displays of defiance during May Day events, the Cuban government has preserved institutional control through its security apparatus, limited prisoner releases, and selective engagement with foreign suppliers such as Russia. Recent high-level contacts, including the CIA director’s May 14 visit conveying demands for fundamental reforms, signal ongoing diplomatic pressure rather than imminent collapse. Traders assess these factors as supporting regime endurance through 2026, consistent with the 71.5% implied probability on “No.”
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$252,724Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Intensified U.S. sanctions targeting Cuba’s military-linked economic conglomerate GAESA, combined with an oil blockade following the January 2026 removal of Venezuela’s Maduro, have deepened fuel shortages, blackouts, and economic contraction on the island. Despite mounting protests, record emigration, and public displays of defiance during May Day events, the Cuban government has preserved institutional control through its security apparatus, limited prisoner releases, and selective engagement with foreign suppliers such as Russia. Recent high-level contacts, including the CIA director’s May 14 visit conveying demands for fundamental reforms, signal ongoing diplomatic pressure rather than imminent collapse. Traders assess these factors as supporting regime endurance through 2026, consistent with the 71.5% implied probability on “No.”
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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