**US pressure via fuel sanctions and a de facto blockade since January 2026—triggered by the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies after the US intervention there—has created severe shortages, blackouts, and economic strain on Cuba.** Despite explicit US statements favoring regime change or a leadership deal by year-end under President Trump, the Communist Party government led by Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through internal security forces, limited prisoner releases, high-level bilateral talks, and mid-2026 economic measures that ease some restrictions on private activity, land use, and imports while preserving state dominance in key sectors. Analysts and intelligence assessments highlight the regime’s historical resilience and capacity for tactical adaptation rather than collapse, with the military and security apparatus serving as the primary stabilizer. Recent months show no mass protests capable of forcing systemic change, continued government-organized demonstrations, and a pattern of managed deterioration instead of fracture. Traders price the full regime falling in 2026 at low odds because these factors outweigh external pressure without evidence of decisive internal breakdown.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourLe régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Le régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Oui
12% chance
$1,613,586 Vol.
$1,613,586 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
Oui
12% chance
$1,613,586 Vol.
$1,613,586 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**US pressure via fuel sanctions and a de facto blockade since January 2026—triggered by the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies after the US intervention there—has created severe shortages, blackouts, and economic strain on Cuba.** Despite explicit US statements favoring regime change or a leadership deal by year-end under President Trump, the Communist Party government led by Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through internal security forces, limited prisoner releases, high-level bilateral talks, and mid-2026 economic measures that ease some restrictions on private activity, land use, and imports while preserving state dominance in key sectors.
Analysts and intelligence assessments highlight the regime’s historical resilience and capacity for tactical adaptation rather than collapse, with the military and security apparatus serving as the primary stabilizer. Recent months show no mass protests capable of forcing systemic change, continued government-organized demonstrations, and a pattern of managed deterioration instead of fracture. Traders price the full regime falling in 2026 at low odds because these factors outweigh external pressure without evidence of decisive internal breakdown.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volume
$1,613,586Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**US pressure via fuel sanctions and a de facto blockade since January 2026—triggered by the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies after the US intervention there—has created severe shortages, blackouts, and economic strain on Cuba.** Despite explicit US statements favoring regime change or a leadership deal by year-end under President Trump, the Communist Party government led by Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through internal security forces, limited prisoner releases, high-level bilateral talks, and mid-2026 economic measures that ease some restrictions on private activity, land use, and imports while preserving state dominance in key sectors.
Analysts and intelligence assessments highlight the regime’s historical resilience and capacity for tactical adaptation rather than collapse, with the military and security apparatus serving as the primary stabilizer. Recent months show no mass protests capable of forcing systemic change, continued government-organized demonstrations, and a pattern of managed deterioration instead of fracture. Traders price the full regime falling in 2026 at low odds because these factors outweigh external pressure without evidence of decisive internal breakdown.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$1,613,586Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**US pressure via fuel sanctions and a de facto blockade since January 2026—triggered by the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies after the US intervention there—has created severe shortages, blackouts, and economic strain on Cuba.** Despite explicit US statements favoring regime change or a leadership deal by year-end under President Trump, the Communist Party government led by Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through internal security forces, limited prisoner releases, high-level bilateral talks, and mid-2026 economic measures that ease some restrictions on private activity, land use, and imports while preserving state dominance in key sectors. Analysts and intelligence assessments highlight the regime’s historical resilience and capacity for tactical adaptation rather than collapse, with the military and security apparatus serving as the primary stabilizer. Recent months show no mass protests capable of forcing systemic change, continued government-organized demonstrations, and a pattern of managed deterioration instead of fracture. Traders price the full regime falling in 2026 at low odds because these factors outweigh external pressure without evidence of decisive internal breakdown.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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