The high trader consensus against Iranian regime collapse before 2027 reflects the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggered leadership succession to Mojtaba Khamenei. The regime maintained command continuity, contained major protests through lethal force in late 2025 and early 2026, and adapted to sustained sanctions and naval pressures without elite defections or nationwide institutional breakdown. Recent developments, including the June 2026 memorandum of understanding, stalled diplomatic talks, and ongoing economic measures as of late August, have further entrenched the view that external military and financial pressure alone rarely produces rapid regime change absent converging internal factors such as security force fractures or coordinated civil mobilization. Historical patterns of authoritarian endurance under similar stress reinforce current implied probabilities.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourOui
7% chance
$25,310,255 Vol.
$25,310,255 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
Oui
7% chance
$25,310,255 Vol.
$25,310,255 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting. The high trader consensus against Iranian regime collapse before 2027 reflects the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggered leadership succession to Mojtaba Khamenei. The regime maintained command continuity, contained major protests through lethal force in late 2025 and early 2026, and adapted to sustained sanctions and naval pressures without elite defections or nationwide institutional breakdown. Recent developments, including the June 2026 memorandum of understanding, stalled diplomatic talks, and ongoing economic measures as of late August, have further entrenched the view that external military and financial pressure alone rarely produces rapid regime change absent converging internal factors such as security force fractures or coordinated civil mobilization. Historical patterns of authoritarian endurance under similar stress reinforce current implied probabilities.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ET
Volume
$25,310,255Date de fin
1 janv. 2027Marché ouvert
Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ETRésolveur
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting. The high trader consensus against Iranian regime collapse before 2027 reflects the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggered leadership succession to Mojtaba Khamenei. The regime maintained command continuity, contained major protests through lethal force in late 2025 and early 2026, and adapted to sustained sanctions and naval pressures without elite defections or nationwide institutional breakdown. Recent developments, including the June 2026 memorandum of understanding, stalled diplomatic talks, and ongoing economic measures as of late August, have further entrenched the view that external military and financial pressure alone rarely produces rapid regime change absent converging internal factors such as security force fractures or coordinated civil mobilization. Historical patterns of authoritarian endurance under similar stress reinforce current implied probabilities.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$25,310,255Date de fin
1 janv. 2027Marché ouvert
Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ETRésolveur
0x65070BE91...The high trader consensus against Iranian regime collapse before 2027 reflects the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggered leadership succession to Mojtaba Khamenei. The regime maintained command continuity, contained major protests through lethal force in late 2025 and early 2026, and adapted to sustained sanctions and naval pressures without elite defections or nationwide institutional breakdown. Recent developments, including the June 2026 memorandum of understanding, stalled diplomatic talks, and ongoing economic measures as of late August, have further entrenched the view that external military and financial pressure alone rarely produces rapid regime change absent converging internal factors such as security force fractures or coordinated civil mobilization. Historical patterns of authoritarian endurance under similar stress reinforce current implied probabilities.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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