The Cuban regime's continued hold on power amid acute economic hardship and U.S. maximum-pressure sanctions underpins the 87.5% trader consensus against a 2026 collapse. Severe fuel shortages and repeated nationwide blackouts have intensified since the January oil embargo, yet the Communist Party leadership under President Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained control through security apparatus and limited June reforms expanding private enterprise, foreign investment, and market mechanisms. Stalled U.S.-Cuba talks, a lack of sustained mass protests capable of forcing transition, and shifting U.S. priorities elsewhere have reduced near-term regime-change momentum, even as indictments, secondary sanctions, and external isolation persist.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourLe régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Le régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Oui
13% chance
$1,624,340 Vol.
$1,624,340 Vol.
30 déc. 2026
Oui
13% chance
$1,624,340 Vol.
$1,624,340 Vol.
30 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The Cuban regime's continued hold on power amid acute economic hardship and U.S. maximum-pressure sanctions underpins the 87.5% trader consensus against a 2026 collapse. Severe fuel shortages and repeated nationwide blackouts have intensified since the January oil embargo, yet the Communist Party leadership under President Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained control through security apparatus and limited June reforms expanding private enterprise, foreign investment, and market mechanisms. Stalled U.S.-Cuba talks, a lack of sustained mass protests capable of forcing transition, and shifting U.S. priorities elsewhere have reduced near-term regime-change momentum, even as indictments, secondary sanctions, and external isolation persist.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volume
$1,624,340Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The Cuban regime's continued hold on power amid acute economic hardship and U.S. maximum-pressure sanctions underpins the 87.5% trader consensus against a 2026 collapse. Severe fuel shortages and repeated nationwide blackouts have intensified since the January oil embargo, yet the Communist Party leadership under President Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained control through security apparatus and limited June reforms expanding private enterprise, foreign investment, and market mechanisms. Stalled U.S.-Cuba talks, a lack of sustained mass protests capable of forcing transition, and shifting U.S. priorities elsewhere have reduced near-term regime-change momentum, even as indictments, secondary sanctions, and external isolation persist.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$1,624,340Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...The Cuban regime's continued hold on power amid acute economic hardship and U.S. maximum-pressure sanctions underpins the 87.5% trader consensus against a 2026 collapse. Severe fuel shortages and repeated nationwide blackouts have intensified since the January oil embargo, yet the Communist Party leadership under President Miguel Díaz-Canel has maintained control through security apparatus and limited June reforms expanding private enterprise, foreign investment, and market mechanisms. Stalled U.S.-Cuba talks, a lack of sustained mass protests capable of forcing transition, and shifting U.S. priorities elsewhere have reduced near-term regime-change momentum, even as indictments, secondary sanctions, and external isolation persist.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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