The trader consensus assigning an 87.5% probability to “No” on the Cuban regime falling in 2026 rests on the Communist Party’s institutional cohesion and the Revolutionary Armed Forces’ role in containing unrest despite the U.S. fuel blockade imposed since January and resulting power outages. Sporadic protests have occurred but remain localized and suppressed, while Havana has pursued limited economic reforms—including private-sector openings and diaspora investment approvals—and engaged in bilateral negotiations that produced prisoner releases. These adaptations, alongside the regime’s record of surviving decades of external pressure, support continuity expectations through December 31.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于是
13% 概率
$1,628,673 交易量
$1,628,673 交易量
2026-12-30
是
13% 概率
$1,628,673 交易量
$1,628,673 交易量
2026-12-30
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The trader consensus assigning an 87.5% probability to “No” on the Cuban regime falling in 2026 rests on the Communist Party’s institutional cohesion and the Revolutionary Armed Forces’ role in containing unrest despite the U.S. fuel blockade imposed since January and resulting power outages. Sporadic protests have occurred but remain localized and suppressed, while Havana has pursued limited economic reforms—including private-sector openings and diaspora investment approvals—and engaged in bilateral negotiations that produced prisoner releases. These adaptations, alongside the regime’s record of surviving decades of external pressure, support continuity expectations through December 31.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市场开放时间： Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
交易量
$1,628,673结束日期
2026-12-31市场开放时间
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
The trader consensus assigning an 87.5% probability to “No” on the Cuban regime falling in 2026 rests on the Communist Party’s institutional cohesion and the Revolutionary Armed Forces’ role in containing unrest despite the U.S. fuel blockade imposed since January and resulting power outages. Sporadic protests have occurred but remain localized and suppressed, while Havana has pursued limited economic reforms—including private-sector openings and diaspora investment approvals—and engaged in bilateral negotiations that produced prisoner releases. These adaptations, alongside the regime’s record of surviving decades of external pressure, support continuity expectations through December 31.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$1,628,673结束日期
2026-12-31市场开放时间
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...The trader consensus assigning an 87.5% probability to “No” on the Cuban regime falling in 2026 rests on the Communist Party’s institutional cohesion and the Revolutionary Armed Forces’ role in containing unrest despite the U.S. fuel blockade imposed since January and resulting power outages. Sporadic protests have occurred but remain localized and suppressed, while Havana has pursued limited economic reforms—including private-sector openings and diaspora investment approvals—and engaged in bilateral negotiations that produced prisoner releases. These adaptations, alongside the regime’s record of surviving decades of external pressure, support continuity expectations through December 31.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
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