**Tensions between China and Japan have risen sharply since November 2025, driven primarily by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements linking potential Chinese military action against Taiwan to Japan’s survival-threatening situation and right to collective self-defense.** This has prompted Beijing to accuse Tokyo of interference and “neo-militarism,” cancel meetings, impose export controls on dual-use items and rare earths, and step up gray-zone maritime activity around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and in Japan’s claimed EEZ. Chinese coast guard and naval vessels have conducted frequent incursions, live-fire drills (including one with Russian participation near Okinotori in July 2026), and joint bomber patrols, while Japan has protested these moves, scrambled aircraft, deployed long-range missiles to southwestern islands, accelerated defense spending toward 2% of GDP, and eased arms export rules. Despite the friction, traders assign only a 6.5% chance of a direct military clash before 2027 because both governments have kept incidents below the kinetic threshold through coast-guard standoffs, diplomatic protests, and surveillance rather than force-on-force engagements. Economic interdependence, existing crisis hotlines (though tested unevenly), and mutual interest in tactical stabilization ahead of the November 2026 APEC summit continue to constrain escalation. Recent August 2026 visits by Japanese lawmakers to Beijing and ongoing calls for managed coexistence further support the view that posturing will persist without crossing into open conflict through year-end.