Diplomatic negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine over a bilateral security guarantee remain stalled, with persistent disagreements over duration and conditions preventing any formal commitment ahead of the June 30 deadline. The United States has offered a 15-year arrangement as part of broader peace talks, yet Ukrainian leaders have insisted on a minimum 20-year legally binding pact that includes explicit support for post-ceasefire reassurance forces and avoids linkage to territorial concessions in Donbas. April talks with U.S. envoys produced limited signals of progress on strengthened assurances, but no signing or congressional submission has occurred, amid concerns over post-transition reliability. With weeks remaining and no recent official announcements, trader consensus prices the outcome at very low probability.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Estados Unidos acuerda dar garantías de seguridad a Ucrania antes del 30 de junio?
¿Estados Unidos acuerda dar garantías de seguridad a Ucrania antes del 30 de junio?
Sí
$147,021 Vol.
$147,021 Vol.
31 dic 2026
Sí
$147,021 Vol.
$147,021 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Diplomatic negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine over a bilateral security guarantee remain stalled, with persistent disagreements over duration and conditions preventing any formal commitment ahead of the June 30 deadline. The United States has offered a 15-year arrangement as part of broader peace talks, yet Ukrainian leaders have insisted on a minimum 20-year legally binding pact that includes explicit support for post-ceasefire reassurance forces and avoids linkage to territorial concessions in Donbas. April talks with U.S. envoys produced limited signals of progress on strengthened assurances, but no signing or congressional submission has occurred, amid concerns over post-transition reliability. With weeks remaining and no recent official announcements, trader consensus prices the outcome at very low probability.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Volumen
$147,021Fecha de finalización
30 jun 2026Mercado abierto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Diplomatic negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine over a bilateral security guarantee remain stalled, with persistent disagreements over duration and conditions preventing any formal commitment ahead of the June 30 deadline. The United States has offered a 15-year arrangement as part of broader peace talks, yet Ukrainian leaders have insisted on a minimum 20-year legally binding pact that includes explicit support for post-ceasefire reassurance forces and avoids linkage to territorial concessions in Donbas. April talks with U.S. envoys produced limited signals of progress on strengthened assurances, but no signing or congressional submission has occurred, amid concerns over post-transition reliability. With weeks remaining and no recent official announcements, trader consensus prices the outcome at very low probability.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$147,021Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Diplomatic negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine over a bilateral security guarantee remain stalled, with persistent disagreements over duration and conditions preventing any formal commitment ahead of the June 30 deadline. The United States has offered a 15-year arrangement as part of broader peace talks, yet Ukrainian leaders have insisted on a minimum 20-year legally binding pact that includes explicit support for post-ceasefire reassurance forces and avoids linkage to territorial concessions in Donbas. April talks with U.S. envoys produced limited signals of progress on strengthened assurances, but no signing or congressional submission has occurred, amid concerns over post-transition reliability. With weeks remaining and no recent official announcements, trader consensus prices the outcome at very low probability.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
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