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icon for 米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？
政治·Trump - Zelenskyy

米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？

icon for 米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？
政治·Trump - Zelenskyy

米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？

6月 30

6月 30

はい

6% 確率
Polymarket

$147,021 Vol.

はい

6% 確率
Polymarket

$147,021 Vol.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Diplomatic negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine over a bilateral security guarantee remain stalled, with persistent disagreements over duration and conditions preventing any formal commitment ahead of the June 30 deadline. The United States has offered a 15-year arrangement as part of broader peace talks, yet Ukrainian leaders have insisted on a minimum 20-year legally binding pact that includes explicit support for post-ceasefire reassurance forces and avoids linkage to territorial concessions in Donbas. April talks with U.S. envoys produced limited signals of progress on strengthened assurances, but no signing or congressional submission has occurred, amid concerns over post-transition reliability. With weeks remaining and no recent official announcements, trader consensus prices the outcome at very low probability.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
音量
$147,021
終了日
2026/06/30
マーケット開始日
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Diplomatic negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine over a bilateral security guarantee remain stalled, with persistent disagreements over duration and conditions preventing any formal commitment ahead of the June 30 deadline. The United States has offered a 15-year arrangement as part of broader peace talks, yet Ukrainian leaders have insisted on a minimum 20-year legally binding pact that includes explicit support for post-ceasefire reassurance forces and avoids linkage to territorial concessions in Donbas. April talks with U.S. envoys produced limited signals of progress on strengthened assurances, but no signing or congressional submission has occurred, amid concerns over post-transition reliability. With weeks remaining and no recent official announcements, trader consensus prices the outcome at very low probability.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
音量
$147,021
終了日
2026/12/31
マーケット開始日
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.

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よくある質問

「米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？ 」はPolymarket上の2個の結果が可能な予測市場で、トレーダーが何が起こるかに基づいてシェアを売買します。現在のリード結果は「米国が6月30日までにウクライナに安全保障の保証を与えることに同意？」で6%です。価格はコミュニティのリアルタイム確率を反映しています。例えば、6¢で取引されているシェアは、市場がその結果に6%の確率を集合的に割り当てていることを意味します。これらのオッズは継続的に変化します。正しい結果のシェアは市場決済時に各$1で引き換え可能です。

本日現在、「米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？ 」は$147Kの総取引量を生み出しています（Dec 28, 2025のマーケット開始以来）。この取引活動レベルはPolymarketコミュニティの強い関与を反映し、現在のオッズが幅広い市場参加者によって形成されていることを保証します。このページで直接、ライブの価格変動を追跡し、任意の結果で取引できます。

「米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？ 」で取引するには、このページに記載されている2個の利用可能な結果を閲覧します。各結果には市場の暗示確率を表す現在の価格が表示されています。ポジションを取るには、最も可能性が高いと思う結果を選び、「はい」で支持するか「いいえ」で反対するかを選択し、金額を入力して「取引」をクリックします。選んだ結果が市場決済時に正しければ、「はい」のシェアは各$1を支払います。正しくなければ$0です。決済前にいつでもシェアを売却できます。

これは非常に拮抗した市場です。「米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？ 」の現在のリーダーは「米国が6月30日までにウクライナに安全保障の保証を与えることに同意？」でわずか6%です。どの結果も強い多数派を占めていないため、トレーダーはこれを非常に不確実と見ており、独自の取引機会を提供する可能性があります。これらのオッズはリアルタイムで更新されますので、このページをブックマークしてください。

「米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？ 」の決済ルールは、各結果が勝者と宣言されるために何が起こる必要があるかを正確に定義しています。これには結果を決定するために使用される公式データソースも含まれます。このページのコメント上にある「ルール」セクションで完全な決済基準を確認できます。取引前にルールを注意深く読むことをお勧めします。