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Polityka·Trump Zełenski

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?

icon for U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
Polityka·Trump Zełenski

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?

Jun 30

Jun 30

6% szansa
Polymarket

$146,920 Wol.

6% szansa
Polymarket

$146,920 Wol.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security guarantee at just 5.5% likelihood by June 30, reflecting stalled negotiations under the Trump administration despite early 2026 optimism from Zelenskyy's claims of a near-finalized pact. Key hurdles include U.S. insistence on a 15-year executive agreement conditional on a ceasefire—implicitly tied to territorial concessions in Donbas, per Zelenskyy's March statements—versus Kyiv's demands for a 20-year, Congress-ratified treaty akin to NATO Article 5. Recent State Department clarifications from Secretary Rubio emphasize post-war activation without direct Donbas linkage, but no progress has materialized in the past month amid ongoing peace talks. With the deadline approaching and historical precedents like the non-binding 2024 pact underscoring enforceability risks, traders see slim odds of resolution.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Wolumen
$146,920
Data zakończenia
Jun 30, 2026
Rynek otwarty
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security guarantee at just 5.5% likelihood by June 30, reflecting stalled negotiations under the Trump administration despite early 2026 optimism from Zelenskyy's claims of a near-finalized pact. Key hurdles include U.S. insistence on a 15-year executive agreement conditional on a ceasefire—implicitly tied to territorial concessions in Donbas, per Zelenskyy's March statements—versus Kyiv's demands for a 20-year, Congress-ratified treaty akin to NATO Article 5. Recent State Department clarifications from Secretary Rubio emphasize post-war activation without direct Donbas linkage, but no progress has materialized in the past month amid ongoing peace talks. With the deadline approaching and historical precedents like the non-binding 2024 pact underscoring enforceability risks, traders see slim odds of resolution.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Wolumen
$146,920
Data zakończenia
Dec 31, 2026
Rynek otwarty
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.

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"U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30? " to rynek prognoz na Polymarket, gdzie traderzy kupują i sprzedają udziały "Tak" lub "Nie" w zależności od tego, czy wierzą, że to wydarzenie nastąpi. Obecne zbiorowe prawdopodobieństwo to 6% na "Yes". Na przykład, jeśli "Tak" kosztuje 6¢, rynek zbiorowo przypisuje 6% szansy na to, że to wydarzenie nastąpi. Te kursy zmieniają się ciągle, gdy traderzy reagują na nowe informacje i wydarzenia. Udziały w poprawnym wyniku można wymienić na $1 za sztukę po rozstrzygnięciu rynku.

Na dzień dzisiejszy "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30? " wygenerował $146.9K łącznego wolumenu od uruchomienia rynku Dec 28, 2025. Ten poziom aktywności handlowej odzwierciedla silne zaangażowanie społeczności Polymarket i pomaga zapewnić, że bieżące kursy są informowane przez głęboką pulę uczestników rynku. Możesz śledzić ruchy cen na żywo i handlować na dowolny wynik bezpośrednio na tej stronie.

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Obecne prawdopodobieństwo dla "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30? " to 6% na "Yes". Oznacza to, że społeczność Polymarket uważa, że istnieje 6% szansy na to, że to wydarzenie nastąpi. Te kursy aktualizują się w czasie rzeczywistym na podstawie rzeczywistych transakcji, dostarczając ciągle aktualizowany sygnał tego, czego rynek oczekuje.

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