Trader consensus prices "No" at 94.5% for a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid ongoing Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Despite Zelenskyy's January claims of a "100% ready" document—initially tied to a 15-year U.S. commitment conditional on Donbas concessions—no official signing or White House confirmation has emerged in the past four months. Recent U.S. actions, like the May 5 State Department approval of $373 million in precision bomb kits, provide material aid but fall short of binding guarantees requiring Senate ratification. Falling Ukrainian trust in U.S. support (down to 27% per polls) and Zelenskyy's April doubts over post-Trump commitments underscore barriers, with no scheduled summits or deadlines before resolution. Late developments like a ceasefire could shift odds, but current impasse dominates.
Eksperimental na AI-generated summary na nire-reference ang Polymarket data. Hindi ito trading advice at wala itong papel sa kung paano nire-resolve ang market na ito. · Na-updateU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
$146,920 Vol.
$146,920 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
$146,920 Vol.
$146,920 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 94.5% for a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid ongoing Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Despite Zelenskyy's January claims of a "100% ready" document—initially tied to a 15-year U.S. commitment conditional on Donbas concessions—no official signing or White House confirmation has emerged in the past four months. Recent U.S. actions, like the May 5 State Department approval of $373 million in precision bomb kits, provide material aid but fall short of binding guarantees requiring Senate ratification. Falling Ukrainian trust in U.S. support (down to 27% per polls) and Zelenskyy's April doubts over post-Trump commitments underscore barriers, with no scheduled summits or deadlines before resolution. Late developments like a ceasefire could shift odds, but current impasse dominates.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Binuksan ang Market: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Volume
$146,920Petsa ng Pagtatapos
Jun 30, 2026Binuksan ang Market
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 94.5% for a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid ongoing Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Despite Zelenskyy's January claims of a "100% ready" document—initially tied to a 15-year U.S. commitment conditional on Donbas concessions—no official signing or White House confirmation has emerged in the past four months. Recent U.S. actions, like the May 5 State Department approval of $373 million in precision bomb kits, provide material aid but fall short of binding guarantees requiring Senate ratification. Falling Ukrainian trust in U.S. support (down to 27% per polls) and Zelenskyy's April doubts over post-Trump commitments underscore barriers, with no scheduled summits or deadlines before resolution. Late developments like a ceasefire could shift odds, but current impasse dominates.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$146,920Petsa ng Pagtatapos
Dec 31, 2026Binuksan ang Market
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices "No" at 94.5% for a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, reflecting stalled bilateral negotiations amid ongoing Russia-Ukraine peace talks. Despite Zelenskyy's January claims of a "100% ready" document—initially tied to a 15-year U.S. commitment conditional on Donbas concessions—no official signing or White House confirmation has emerged in the past four months. Recent U.S. actions, like the May 5 State Department approval of $373 million in precision bomb kits, provide material aid but fall short of binding guarantees requiring Senate ratification. Falling Ukrainian trust in U.S. support (down to 27% per polls) and Zelenskyy's April doubts over post-Trump commitments underscore barriers, with no scheduled summits or deadlines before resolution. Late developments like a ceasefire could shift odds, but current impasse dominates.
Eksperimental na AI-generated summary na nire-reference ang Polymarket data. Hindi ito trading advice at wala itong papel sa kung paano nire-resolve ang market na ito. · Na-update
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