Recent U.S. and Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 and February–March 2026 damaged Iran's key enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan, destroying above-ground infrastructure, impairing centrifuge operations, and isolating or burying near-weapons-grade uranium stockpiles. IAEA assessments highlight ongoing gaps in safeguards access and continuity of knowledge but report no verified weaponization activities or test preparations at sites such as Taleghan 2. U.S. intelligence estimates place Iran's timeline to produce a weapon at nine to twelve months if leaders chose to pursue that path. Slow reconstruction efforts amid heightened detection risks further constrain near-term options. These verified setbacks to enrichment and weaponization pathways underpin trader consensus reflected in the 95% implied probability against an Iranian nuclear test by December 31, 2026.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · ОновленоIran nuclear test before 2027?
$235,602 Обс.
$235,602 Обс.
$235,602 Обс.
$235,602 Обс.
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Iran that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Iran may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Iran. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Iran.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Ринок відкрито: Nov 5, 2025, 2:43 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Iran that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Iran may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Iran. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Iran.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Recent U.S. and Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 and February–March 2026 damaged Iran's key enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan, destroying above-ground infrastructure, impairing centrifuge operations, and isolating or burying near-weapons-grade uranium stockpiles. IAEA assessments highlight ongoing gaps in safeguards access and continuity of knowledge but report no verified weaponization activities or test preparations at sites such as Taleghan 2. U.S. intelligence estimates place Iran's timeline to produce a weapon at nine to twelve months if leaders chose to pursue that path. Slow reconstruction efforts amid heightened detection risks further constrain near-term options. These verified setbacks to enrichment and weaponization pathways underpin trader consensus reflected in the 95% implied probability against an Iranian nuclear test by December 31, 2026.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено



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