The Iranian regime’s survival through the intense protests of early 2026, followed by leadership transition after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death and sustained US-Israel military pressure, underpins trader expectations that it will not fall before 2027. Security forces maintained cohesion with no major defections during the widespread unrest and crackdown, while the new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei has consolidated authority around hardline military and clerical figures. Ongoing economic strain from sanctions, currency weakness, and conflict has not yet produced renewed nationwide mobilization capable of toppling the system. Recent moves—including targeted arrests of protest organizers and defiant public statements—signal continued prioritization of internal control. These factors align with the 92.5% implied probability on “No,” reflecting the regime’s demonstrated capacity to absorb shocks without institutional breakdown.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · ОновленоТак
$25,352,457 Обс.
$25,352,457 Обс.
Так
$25,352,457 Обс.
$25,352,457 Обс.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Ринок відкрито: Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ET
Вирішувач
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Вирішувач
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime’s survival through the intense protests of early 2026, followed by leadership transition after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death and sustained US-Israel military pressure, underpins trader expectations that it will not fall before 2027. Security forces maintained cohesion with no major defections during the widespread unrest and crackdown, while the new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei has consolidated authority around hardline military and clerical figures. Ongoing economic strain from sanctions, currency weakness, and conflict has not yet produced renewed nationwide mobilization capable of toppling the system. Recent moves—including targeted arrests of protest organizers and defiant public statements—signal continued prioritization of internal control. These factors align with the 92.5% implied probability on “No,” reflecting the regime’s demonstrated capacity to absorb shocks without institutional breakdown.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено



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