Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement at just 5.5% likelihood by June 30, reflecting stalled negotiations under the Trump administration, which has conditioned guarantees on progress in Russia-Ukraine peace talks involving potential territorial concessions like Donbas. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a 15-year pact was "100% ready" and April signals of progress after envoy calls, no White House announcements, formal signing, or congressional submission have occurred in recent weeks. Disputes over duration—Ukraine seeking 20 years—and Senate ratification barriers amid domestic fiscal debates further dim prospects, though a sudden diplomatic summit or ceasefire breakthrough could shift dynamics before the deadline.
Tóm tắt AI thử nghiệm tham chiếu dữ liệu Polymarket. Đây không phải tư vấn giao dịch và không ảnh hưởng đến cách thị trường này được giải quyết. · Cập nhậtU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
$146,870 KL.
$146,870 KL.
Dec 31, 2026
$146,870 KL.
$146,870 KL.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement at just 5.5% likelihood by June 30, reflecting stalled negotiations under the Trump administration, which has conditioned guarantees on progress in Russia-Ukraine peace talks involving potential territorial concessions like Donbas. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a 15-year pact was "100% ready" and April signals of progress after envoy calls, no White House announcements, formal signing, or congressional submission have occurred in recent weeks. Disputes over duration—Ukraine seeking 20 years—and Senate ratification barriers amid domestic fiscal debates further dim prospects, though a sudden diplomatic summit or ceasefire breakthrough could shift dynamics before the deadline.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Thị trường mở: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Khối lượng
$146,870Ngày kết thúc
Jun 30, 2026Thị trường mở
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement at just 5.5% likelihood by June 30, reflecting stalled negotiations under the Trump administration, which has conditioned guarantees on progress in Russia-Ukraine peace talks involving potential territorial concessions like Donbas. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a 15-year pact was "100% ready" and April signals of progress after envoy calls, no White House announcements, formal signing, or congressional submission have occurred in recent weeks. Disputes over duration—Ukraine seeking 20 years—and Senate ratification barriers amid domestic fiscal debates further dim prospects, though a sudden diplomatic summit or ceasefire breakthrough could shift dynamics before the deadline.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Khối lượng
$146,870Ngày kết thúc
Dec 31, 2026Thị trường mở
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement at just 5.5% likelihood by June 30, reflecting stalled negotiations under the Trump administration, which has conditioned guarantees on progress in Russia-Ukraine peace talks involving potential territorial concessions like Donbas. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a 15-year pact was "100% ready" and April signals of progress after envoy calls, no White House announcements, formal signing, or congressional submission have occurred in recent weeks. Disputes over duration—Ukraine seeking 20 years—and Senate ratification barriers amid domestic fiscal debates further dim prospects, though a sudden diplomatic summit or ceasefire breakthrough could shift dynamics before the deadline.
Tóm tắt AI thử nghiệm tham chiếu dữ liệu Polymarket. Đây không phải tư vấn giao dịch và không ảnh hưởng đến cách thị trường này được giải quyết. · Cập nhật
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