Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
$709,549 交易量
$709,549 交易量
2026-12-31
$709,549 交易量
$709,549 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市场开放时间： Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
交易量
$709,549结束日期
2026-06-30市场开放时间
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$709,549结束日期
2026-12-31市场开放时间
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
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