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icon for U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
Politics·Trump-Zelenskyy

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?

icon for U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
Politics·Trump-Zelenskyy

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?

Jun 30

Dec 31

Jun 30

Dec 31

<1% peluang
Polymarket

$171,237 Vol.

<1% peluang
Polymarket

$171,237 Vol.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$171,237
Tanggal Berakhir
Jun 30, 2026
Pasar Dibuka
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$171,237
Tanggal Berakhir
Dec 31, 2026
Pasar Dibuka
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.

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Pertanyaan yang Sering Diajukan

"U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?" adalah pasar prediksi di Polymarket di mana trader membeli dan menjual saham "Ya" atau "Tidak" berdasarkan apakah mereka yakin event ini akan terjadi. Probabilitas crowd-sourced saat ini adalah 0% untuk "Yes." Misalnya, jika "Ya" dihargai 0¢, pasar secara kolektif memberikan peluang 0% bahwa event ini akan terjadi. Peluang ini bergeser terus-menerus saat trader bereaksi terhadap perkembangan dan informasi baru. Saham dengan hasil yang benar bisa ditukarkan seharga $1 setiap saham saat pasar diselesaikan.

Per hari ini, "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?" telah menghasilkan $171.2K dalam total volume trading sejak pasar diluncurkan pada Dec 28, 2025. Tingkat aktivitas trading ini mencerminkan keterlibatan kuat dari komunitas Polymarket dan membantu memastikan bahwa peluang saat ini diinformasikan oleh kumpulan besar peserta pasar. Kamu bisa melacak pergerakan harga langsung dan trading di hasil apa pun langsung di halaman ini.

Untuk trading di "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?," cukup pilih apakah kamu yakin jawabannya "Ya" atau "Tidak." Setiap sisi memiliki harga saat ini yang mencerminkan probabilitas tersirat pasar. Masukkan jumlah kamu dan klik "Trade." Jika kamu membeli saham "Ya" dan hasilnya diselesaikan sebagai "Ya," setiap saham membayar $1. Jika diselesaikan sebagai "Tidak," saham "Ya" kamu bernilai $0. Kamu juga bisa menjual sahammu kapan saja sebelum resolusi jika kamu ingin mengamankan keuntungan atau memotong kerugian.

Probabilitas saat ini untuk "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?" adalah 0% untuk "Yes." Ini berarti keramaian Polymarket saat ini percaya ada peluang 0% bahwa event ini akan terjadi. Peluang ini diperbarui secara real-time berdasarkan trade aktual, memberikan sinyal yang terus diperbarui tentang apa yang diharapkan pasar.

Aturan resolusi untuk "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?" mendefinisikan dengan tepat apa yang harus terjadi agar setiap hasil dinyatakan sebagai pemenang — termasuk sumber data resmi yang digunakan untuk menentukan hasilnya. Kamu bisa meninjau kriteria resolusi lengkap di bagian "Aturan" di halaman ini di atas komentar. Kami menyarankan membaca aturan dengan cermat sebelum trading, karena mereka menentukan kondisi tepat, kasus khusus, dan sumber yang mengatur bagaimana pasar ini diselesaikan.