**The Cuban Communist Party maintains institutional control through military cohesion, expanded repression, and limited economic openings despite acute fuel shortages and blackouts following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies.** U.S. sanctions and tariffs intensified after the 2026 Venezuela intervention, with the Trump administration publicly pressing for change by year-end, yet bilateral talks, prisoner releases, and June 2026 reforms decentralizing administration and allowing diaspora investment have helped contain protests. Analysts note the regime’s historical resilience and preference for incremental adjustments over core structural shifts, aligning with trader consensus that full regime collapse remains unlikely before December 31. Ongoing diplomatic signals and party unity further support the 87.5% implied probability for “No.”
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於是
13% 機率
$1,619,698 交易量
$1,619,698 交易量
2026-12-30
是
13% 機率
$1,619,698 交易量
$1,619,698 交易量
2026-12-30
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**The Cuban Communist Party maintains institutional control through military cohesion, expanded repression, and limited economic openings despite acute fuel shortages and blackouts following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies.** U.S. sanctions and tariffs intensified after the 2026 Venezuela intervention, with the Trump administration publicly pressing for change by year-end, yet bilateral talks, prisoner releases, and June 2026 reforms decentralizing administration and allowing diaspora investment have helped contain protests. Analysts note the regime’s historical resilience and preference for incremental adjustments over core structural shifts, aligning with trader consensus that full regime collapse remains unlikely before December 31. Ongoing diplomatic signals and party unity further support the 87.5% implied probability for “No.”
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市場開放時間： Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
交易量
$1,619,698結束日期
2026-12-31市場開放時間
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**The Cuban Communist Party maintains institutional control through military cohesion, expanded repression, and limited economic openings despite acute fuel shortages and blackouts following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies.** U.S. sanctions and tariffs intensified after the 2026 Venezuela intervention, with the Trump administration publicly pressing for change by year-end, yet bilateral talks, prisoner releases, and June 2026 reforms decentralizing administration and allowing diaspora investment have helped contain protests. Analysts note the regime’s historical resilience and preference for incremental adjustments over core structural shifts, aligning with trader consensus that full regime collapse remains unlikely before December 31. Ongoing diplomatic signals and party unity further support the 87.5% implied probability for “No.”
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$1,619,698結束日期
2026-12-31市場開放時間
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**The Cuban Communist Party maintains institutional control through military cohesion, expanded repression, and limited economic openings despite acute fuel shortages and blackouts following the cutoff of Venezuelan oil supplies.** U.S. sanctions and tariffs intensified after the 2026 Venezuela intervention, with the Trump administration publicly pressing for change by year-end, yet bilateral talks, prisoner releases, and June 2026 reforms decentralizing administration and allowing diaspora investment have helped contain protests. Analysts note the regime’s historical resilience and preference for incremental adjustments over core structural shifts, aligning with trader consensus that full regime collapse remains unlikely before December 31. Ongoing diplomatic signals and party unity further support the 87.5% implied probability for “No.”
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於
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