Tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States, including US-Israeli strikes on Iranian targets and Iranian missile/drone responses in early-to-mid 2026, have repeatedly prompted partial or temporary airspace restrictions, with the OIIX/Tehran FIR only partially reopened by June. Renewed military activity through July sustained EASA advisories against operations in Iranian airspace amid ceasefire uncertainty and Strait of Hormuz disruptions, limiting commercial overflights despite eastern segments reopening. Trader consensus reflected in current pricing assigns the highest probability to a full closure by December 31, driven by these ongoing regional risks and the potential for rapid escalation from diplomatic breakdowns or further strikes, while nearer-term dates show lower implied probabilities consistent with the pattern of limited, reversible measures to date.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · ZaktualizowanoIran full airspace closure by...?
$8,337,959 Wol.
August 15
<1%
August 31
7%
September 30
15%
December 31
32%
$8,337,959 Wol.
August 15
<1%
August 31
7%
September 30
15%
December 31
32%
A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Rynek otwarty: Jul 27, 2026, 1:36 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States, including US-Israeli strikes on Iranian targets and Iranian missile/drone responses in early-to-mid 2026, have repeatedly prompted partial or temporary airspace restrictions, with the OIIX/Tehran FIR only partially reopened by June. Renewed military activity through July sustained EASA advisories against operations in Iranian airspace amid ceasefire uncertainty and Strait of Hormuz disruptions, limiting commercial overflights despite eastern segments reopening. Trader consensus reflected in current pricing assigns the highest probability to a full closure by December 31, driven by these ongoing regional risks and the potential for rapid escalation from diplomatic breakdowns or further strikes, while nearer-term dates show lower implied probabilities consistent with the pattern of limited, reversible measures to date.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano



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