The Iranian regime's survival through the February 2026 US-Israeli airstrikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, followed by rapid succession to his son Mojtaba Khamenei and an April ceasefire, has reinforced trader expectations of continuity into 2027. US intelligence assessments from March 2026 concluded the leadership remained intact and retained public control despite the conflict and January protests. Subsequent developments, including intensified executions of protesters, IRGC coordination with regional proxies, and enforcement of control over the Strait of Hormuz into July and August 2026, underscore institutional resilience and the security apparatus's capacity to manage dissent. Economic strains and sporadic unrest persist without triggering the elite fractures or mass defections needed for rapid regime change. The 93.5% implied probability for "No" aligns with this pattern of adaptation under sustained external and internal pressure.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · ZaktualizowanoTak
$24,680,948 Wol.
$24,680,948 Wol.
Tak
$24,680,948 Wol.
$24,680,948 Wol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Rynek otwarty: Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's survival through the February 2026 US-Israeli airstrikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, followed by rapid succession to his son Mojtaba Khamenei and an April ceasefire, has reinforced trader expectations of continuity into 2027. US intelligence assessments from March 2026 concluded the leadership remained intact and retained public control despite the conflict and January protests. Subsequent developments, including intensified executions of protesters, IRGC coordination with regional proxies, and enforcement of control over the Strait of Hormuz into July and August 2026, underscore institutional resilience and the security apparatus's capacity to manage dissent. Economic strains and sporadic unrest persist without triggering the elite fractures or mass defections needed for rapid regime change. The 93.5% implied probability for "No" aligns with this pattern of adaptation under sustained external and internal pressure.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano



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