The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience after the 2026 conflict with the United States and Israel, including leadership succession following Ali Khamenei's assassination, IRGC consolidation under Mojtaba Khamenei, and containment of nationwide protests from late 2025 into early 2026, underpins trader consensus on low near-term collapse risk. Security forces have maintained cohesion without significant defections, while the government has managed internal factional tensions and economic pressures through repression and institutional continuity. With only weeks until September 30, the absence of verified triggers for rapid regime change—such as coordinated elite fractures or uncontrollable unrest—supports the 98.4% implied probability for "No." Unlikely but plausible shifts could stem from sudden large-scale defections in the security apparatus, unforeseen escalation in external pressures, or acute internal power struggles that erode central control before the deadline.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · ZaktualizowanoWill the Iranian regime fall by September 30?
$1,620,716 Wol.
$1,620,716 Wol.
$1,620,716 Wol.
$1,620,716 Wol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Rynek otwarty: Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience after the 2026 conflict with the United States and Israel, including leadership succession following Ali Khamenei's assassination, IRGC consolidation under Mojtaba Khamenei, and containment of nationwide protests from late 2025 into early 2026, underpins trader consensus on low near-term collapse risk. Security forces have maintained cohesion without significant defections, while the government has managed internal factional tensions and economic pressures through repression and institutional continuity. With only weeks until September 30, the absence of verified triggers for rapid regime change—such as coordinated elite fractures or uncontrollable unrest—supports the 98.4% implied probability for "No." Unlikely but plausible shifts could stem from sudden large-scale defections in the security apparatus, unforeseen escalation in external pressures, or acute internal power struggles that erode central control before the deadline.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano


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