The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience after the February 2026 assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and subsequent U.S.-Israeli strikes underpins traders' near-certain expectation that it will not collapse by May 31. Recent assessments from U.S. intelligence and independent monitoring confirm the leadership transition to Mojtaba Khamenei has held, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintaining internal security, quelling protests through arrests and executions, and beginning military reconstitution during the current ceasefire. Economic pressures and domestic unrest concerns persist, yet officials have prioritized control mechanisms such as Basij mobilization without triggering systemic breakdown. While factors like further escalation, leadership fractures, or coordinated opposition action could theoretically intervene in the narrow remaining window, the absence of such developments in the past month reinforces the high barriers to rapid regime change.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Caerá el régimen iraní antes del 31 de mayo?
Sí
$20,368,835 Vol.
$20,368,835 Vol.
Sí
$20,368,835 Vol.
$20,368,835 Vol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Apr 1, 2026, 12:20 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience after the February 2026 assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and subsequent U.S.-Israeli strikes underpins traders' near-certain expectation that it will not collapse by May 31. Recent assessments from U.S. intelligence and independent monitoring confirm the leadership transition to Mojtaba Khamenei has held, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintaining internal security, quelling protests through arrests and executions, and beginning military reconstitution during the current ceasefire. Economic pressures and domestic unrest concerns persist, yet officials have prioritized control mechanisms such as Basij mobilization without triggering systemic breakdown. While factors like further escalation, leadership fractures, or coordinated opposition action could theoretically intervene in the narrow remaining window, the absence of such developments in the past month reinforces the high barriers to rapid regime change.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Preguntas frecuentes