**Negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine have produced draft frameworks and statements on security arrangements but have not yielded a finalized, binding U.S. commitment meeting the market’s criteria of a publicly announced, mutually agreed bilateral deal creating a NATO Article 5-style obligation for direct U.S. defense intervention.** Talks since late 2025 have centered on 15-year U.S. guarantees (with possible extension) tied to a broader peace settlement, alongside European “Coalition of the Willing” pledges for monitoring, long-term military support, and activation upon ceasefire. These remain subject to congressional approval in the U.S., territorial concessions, and Russian acceptance—none of which have been resolved as of mid-September 2026. Recent diplomacy has focused on narrower de-escalation steps, such as mutual halts on energy infrastructure strikes, rather than completing a qualifying security guarantee. The 93.5% “No” pricing reflects trader assessment that core barriers—unresolved territorial disputes, preference for European-led arrangements, and the absence of a congressional-ready bilateral pact—make agreement by the December 31, 2026 deadline improbable under current conditions. Ongoing U.S.-mediated trilateral contacts and scheduled high-level meetings could still shift timelines, but no verified breakthrough has occurred to date.
Polymarket ডেটা রেফারেন্স করে পরীক্ষামূলক AI-জেনারেটেড সারাংশ। এটি ট্রেডিং পরামর্শ নয় এবং এই মার্কেট কীভাবে রেজলভ হয় তাতে কোনো ভূমিকা রাখে না। · আপডেটেডU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
7% সম্ভাবনা
$38,140 Vol.
$38,140 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
7% সম্ভাবনা
$38,140 Vol.
$38,140 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine have produced draft frameworks and statements on security arrangements but have not yielded a finalized, binding U.S. commitment meeting the market’s criteria of a publicly announced, mutually agreed bilateral deal creating a NATO Article 5-style obligation for direct U.S. defense intervention.**
Talks since late 2025 have centered on 15-year U.S. guarantees (with possible extension) tied to a broader peace settlement, alongside European “Coalition of the Willing” pledges for monitoring, long-term military support, and activation upon ceasefire. These remain subject to congressional approval in the U.S., territorial concessions, and Russian acceptance—none of which have been resolved as of mid-September 2026. Recent diplomacy has focused on narrower de-escalation steps, such as mutual halts on energy infrastructure strikes, rather than completing a qualifying security guarantee.
The 93.5% “No” pricing reflects trader assessment that core barriers—unresolved territorial disputes, preference for European-led arrangements, and the absence of a congressional-ready bilateral pact—make agreement by the December 31, 2026 deadline improbable under current conditions. Ongoing U.S.-mediated trilateral contacts and scheduled high-level meetings could still shift timelines, but no verified breakthrough has occurred to date.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
মার্কেট ওপেন হয়েছে: May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
ভলিউম
$38,140শেষ তারিখ
Jan 1, 2027মার্কেট ওপেন হয়েছে
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETরেজলভার
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine have produced draft frameworks and statements on security arrangements but have not yielded a finalized, binding U.S. commitment meeting the market’s criteria of a publicly announced, mutually agreed bilateral deal creating a NATO Article 5-style obligation for direct U.S. defense intervention.**
Talks since late 2025 have centered on 15-year U.S. guarantees (with possible extension) tied to a broader peace settlement, alongside European “Coalition of the Willing” pledges for monitoring, long-term military support, and activation upon ceasefire. These remain subject to congressional approval in the U.S., territorial concessions, and Russian acceptance—none of which have been resolved as of mid-September 2026. Recent diplomacy has focused on narrower de-escalation steps, such as mutual halts on energy infrastructure strikes, rather than completing a qualifying security guarantee.
The 93.5% “No” pricing reflects trader assessment that core barriers—unresolved territorial disputes, preference for European-led arrangements, and the absence of a congressional-ready bilateral pact—make agreement by the December 31, 2026 deadline improbable under current conditions. Ongoing U.S.-mediated trilateral contacts and scheduled high-level meetings could still shift timelines, but no verified breakthrough has occurred to date.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
ভলিউম
$38,140শেষ তারিখ
Jan 1, 2027মার্কেট ওপেন হয়েছে
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETরেজলভার
0x65070BE91...**Negotiations between the Trump administration and Ukraine have produced draft frameworks and statements on security arrangements but have not yielded a finalized, binding U.S. commitment meeting the market’s criteria of a publicly announced, mutually agreed bilateral deal creating a NATO Article 5-style obligation for direct U.S. defense intervention.** Talks since late 2025 have centered on 15-year U.S. guarantees (with possible extension) tied to a broader peace settlement, alongside European “Coalition of the Willing” pledges for monitoring, long-term military support, and activation upon ceasefire. These remain subject to congressional approval in the U.S., territorial concessions, and Russian acceptance—none of which have been resolved as of mid-September 2026. Recent diplomacy has focused on narrower de-escalation steps, such as mutual halts on energy infrastructure strikes, rather than completing a qualifying security guarantee. The 93.5% “No” pricing reflects trader assessment that core barriers—unresolved territorial disputes, preference for European-led arrangements, and the absence of a congressional-ready bilateral pact—make agreement by the December 31, 2026 deadline improbable under current conditions. Ongoing U.S.-mediated trilateral contacts and scheduled high-level meetings could still shift timelines, but no verified breakthrough has occurred to date.
Polymarket ডেটা রেফারেন্স করে পরীক্ষামূলক AI-জেনারেটেড সারাংশ। এটি ট্রেডিং পরামর্শ নয় এবং এই মার্কেট কীভাবে রেজলভ হয় তাতে কোনো ভূমিকা রাখে না। · আপডেটেড
বাহ্যিক লিংক থেকে সাবধান।
বাহ্যিক লিংক থেকে সাবধান।
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