China’s sustained preference for grey-zone coercion over direct military action underpins the overwhelming trader consensus against an invasion by year-end. Recent record deployments of coast guard and research vessels around Taiwan—reaching 244 sightings in July alone—along with live-fire drills, median-line crossings, and undersea mapping reflect Beijing’s focus on normalizing jurisdiction, rehearsing supply-line disruption, and eroding Taipei’s resources without triggering full conflict. PLA leadership purges have further complicated planning for a complex amphibious campaign, while Taiwan’s rising defense budgets, unmanned systems procurement, and ongoing Han Kuang exercises strengthen deterrence. Diplomatic channels, including U.S.-China summits, have not altered this pattern. A full-scale invasion within the remaining months would require improbable last-minute mobilization; only sudden escalation from current activities, major leadership shifts, or unforeseen external shocks could still alter the outcome before December 31.