Traders assign an 87.5% probability that China will not invade Taiwan by December 31, 2027, reflecting the absence of observable large-scale amphibious mobilization, logistics surges, or force posture shifts required for a cross-strait campaign. Beijing continues gray-zone pressure through air and naval incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, live-fire drills, and maritime assertions, yet these have not escalated into the sustained buildup analysts associate with imminent kinetic action. Internal PLA leadership challenges, including prior high-level purges, alongside Taiwan’s accelerated asymmetric capabilities such as drone fleets and reservist exercises, raise operational costs. Economic interdependence, sanctions exposure, and U.S. alliance commitments further elevate risks of conflict. Recent U.S. intelligence assessments and the narrow remaining timeline reinforce the current trader consensus on low near-term probability, though rapid diplomatic or internal shifts remain possible variables.