North Korea’s formal redefinition of South Korea as a permanently hostile state, coupled with its abandonment of unification rhetoric and emphasis on nuclear deterrence plus conventional modernization, underpins trader consensus that a full-scale invasion before 2027 remains improbable. Pyongyang has prioritized missile and naval development, border fortifications, and munitions support for Russia over mass mobilization or offensive positioning along the DMZ, while South Korea’s Lee Jae-myung administration has pursued de-escalation through expressions of regret and offers of dialogue amid continued joint U.S.-ROK exercises. The wisdom of crowds reflected in the 96% “No” price aligns with assessments that the military, economic, and alliance risks—particularly U.S. reinforcement commitments—outweigh any perceived gains for Kim Jong-un in the near term. Late-breaking shifts could still arise from miscalculation during provocations, sudden leadership instability, or major external distractions, though these remain low-probability events within the resolution window.