The near-certain trader consensus on “No” for an Iranian regime fall by September 30 stems from the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience after the 2025–2026 protests and associated military confrontations. Security forces suppressed nationwide demonstrations through early 2026 with no elite defections or organized opposition capable of rapid overthrow, while the regime has since pursued military reorganization under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and maintained control amid ongoing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz. With only weeks remaining, no verifiable catalysts—such as mass uprisings, leadership fractures, or decisive external intervention—have materialized to alter this trajectory. Scenarios that could still shift probabilities include an unforeseen internal coup, sudden large-scale defections by security units, or a major escalation that fractures regime cohesion before the deadline, though such developments remain outside current evidence.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · AggiornatoIl regime iraniano cadrà entro il 30 settembre?
Sì
$1,627,320 Vol.
$1,627,320 Vol.
Sì
$1,627,320 Vol.
$1,627,320 Vol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercato aperto: Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The near-certain trader consensus on “No” for an Iranian regime fall by September 30 stems from the Islamic Republic’s demonstrated resilience after the 2025–2026 protests and associated military confrontations. Security forces suppressed nationwide demonstrations through early 2026 with no elite defections or organized opposition capable of rapid overthrow, while the regime has since pursued military reorganization under Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and maintained control amid ongoing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz. With only weeks remaining, no verifiable catalysts—such as mass uprisings, leadership fractures, or decisive external intervention—have materialized to alter this trajectory. Scenarios that could still shift probabilities include an unforeseen internal coup, sudden large-scale defections by security units, or a major escalation that fractures regime cohesion before the deadline, though such developments remain outside current evidence.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato


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