Recent military and diplomatic developments have reinforced trader expectations that Iran's ruling institutions will endure through 2026. Following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's February 2026 assassination and the subsequent U.S.-Israel conflict, a fragile April ceasefire enabled Iranian leaders to propose terms for ending hostilities on Tehran's preferred conditions, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sustained internal security through targeted arrests, executions, and internet restrictions that contained earlier 2025-2026 protests. Economic strains from sanctions and oil storage limits persist without triggering elite defections or renewed nationwide uprisings, consistent with the regime's historical capacity to manage external pressure and succession processes via interim councils. Although late diplomatic shifts or renewed escalation could still alter trajectories before the December 2026 resolution window, current evidence of continuity underpins the 83.5% implied probability against regime change.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · AggiornatoSì
$17,821,853 Vol.
$17,821,853 Vol.
31 dic 2026
Sì
$17,821,853 Vol.
$17,821,853 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting. Recent military and diplomatic developments have reinforced trader expectations that Iran's ruling institutions will endure through 2026. Following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's February 2026 assassination and the subsequent U.S.-Israel conflict, a fragile April ceasefire enabled Iranian leaders to propose terms for ending hostilities on Tehran's preferred conditions, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sustained internal security through targeted arrests, executions, and internet restrictions that contained earlier 2025-2026 protests. Economic strains from sanctions and oil storage limits persist without triggering elite defections or renewed nationwide uprisings, consistent with the regime's historical capacity to manage external pressure and succession processes via interim councils. Although late diplomatic shifts or renewed escalation could still alter trajectories before the December 2026 resolution window, current evidence of continuity underpins the 83.5% implied probability against regime change.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercato aperto: Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ET
Volume
$17,821,853Data di fine
31 dic 2026Mercato aperto
Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting. Recent military and diplomatic developments have reinforced trader expectations that Iran's ruling institutions will endure through 2026. Following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's February 2026 assassination and the subsequent U.S.-Israel conflict, a fragile April ceasefire enabled Iranian leaders to propose terms for ending hostilities on Tehran's preferred conditions, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sustained internal security through targeted arrests, executions, and internet restrictions that contained earlier 2025-2026 protests. Economic strains from sanctions and oil storage limits persist without triggering elite defections or renewed nationwide uprisings, consistent with the regime's historical capacity to manage external pressure and succession processes via interim councils. Although late diplomatic shifts or renewed escalation could still alter trajectories before the December 2026 resolution window, current evidence of continuity underpins the 83.5% implied probability against regime change.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if the Islamic Republic of Iran’s current ruling regime is overthrown, collapsed, or otherwise ceases to govern by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$17,821,871Data di fine
31 dic 2026Mercato aperto
Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Recent military and diplomatic developments have reinforced trader expectations that Iran's ruling institutions will endure through 2026. Following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's February 2026 assassination and the subsequent U.S.-Israel conflict, a fragile April ceasefire enabled Iranian leaders to propose terms for ending hostilities on Tehran's preferred conditions, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps sustained internal security through targeted arrests, executions, and internet restrictions that contained earlier 2025-2026 protests. Economic strains from sanctions and oil storage limits persist without triggering elite defections or renewed nationwide uprisings, consistent with the regime's historical capacity to manage external pressure and succession processes via interim councils. Although late diplomatic shifts or renewed escalation could still alter trajectories before the December 2026 resolution window, current evidence of continuity underpins the 83.5% implied probability against regime change.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato
Fai attenzione ai link esterni.
Fai attenzione ai link esterni.
Domande frequenti