Ongoing U.S.-mediated talks involving envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with Moscow and Kyiv in early September 2026 have advanced discussions on security guarantees for Ukraine, yet major obstacles persist. These include unresolved disputes over territorial concessions in the Donbas, the scope and legal form of any U.S. commitments, and coordination with European partners. Recent diplomatic activity points to potential follow-up negotiations in October rather than swift bilateral agreement. Trader consensus at 94% for no resolution by December 31 reflects these structural barriers and the conditional linkage of guarantees to a broader peace framework still under negotiation.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · ZaktualizowanoU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
7% szansa
$38,088 Wol.
$38,088 Wol.
Dec 31, 2026
7% szansa
$38,088 Wol.
$38,088 Wol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Ongoing U.S.-mediated talks involving envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with Moscow and Kyiv in early September 2026 have advanced discussions on security guarantees for Ukraine, yet major obstacles persist. These include unresolved disputes over territorial concessions in the Donbas, the scope and legal form of any U.S. commitments, and coordination with European partners. Recent diplomatic activity points to potential follow-up negotiations in October rather than swift bilateral agreement. Trader consensus at 94% for no resolution by December 31 reflects these structural barriers and the conditional linkage of guarantees to a broader peace framework still under negotiation.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Rynek otwarty: May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
Wolumen
$38,088Data zakończenia
Jan 1, 2027Rynek otwarty
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETRozstrzygający
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Ongoing U.S.-mediated talks involving envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with Moscow and Kyiv in early September 2026 have advanced discussions on security guarantees for Ukraine, yet major obstacles persist. These include unresolved disputes over territorial concessions in the Donbas, the scope and legal form of any U.S. commitments, and coordination with European partners. Recent diplomatic activity points to potential follow-up negotiations in October rather than swift bilateral agreement. Trader consensus at 94% for no resolution by December 31 reflects these structural barriers and the conditional linkage of guarantees to a broader peace framework still under negotiation.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Wolumen
$38,088Data zakończenia
Jan 1, 2027Rynek otwarty
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETRozstrzygający
0x65070BE91...Ongoing U.S.-mediated talks involving envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner with Moscow and Kyiv in early September 2026 have advanced discussions on security guarantees for Ukraine, yet major obstacles persist. These include unresolved disputes over territorial concessions in the Donbas, the scope and legal form of any U.S. commitments, and coordination with European partners. Recent diplomatic activity points to potential follow-up negotiations in October rather than swift bilateral agreement. Trader consensus at 94% for no resolution by December 31 reflects these structural barriers and the conditional linkage of guarantees to a broader peace framework still under negotiation.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano
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