US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed by Trump administration officials in early 2026, continue to anchor allied security policies and reduce incentives for independent nuclear programs. South Korea and Japan have publicly restated opposition to acquiring weapons, while Saudi Arabia’s July 2026 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States focuses on power generation under bilateral safeguards rather than weaponization. No ally has initiated a breakout from the NPT or secured delivery systems in the resolution window. Ongoing trilateral US-Japan-ROK coordination and NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements further reinforce reliance on existing umbrellas. These factors sustain trader consensus that acquisition remains structurally and diplomatically improbable before 2027.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено6% шанс
$189,146 Обс.
$189,146 Обс.
Dec 31, 2026
6% шанс
$189,146 Обс.
$189,146 Обс.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed by Trump administration officials in early 2026, continue to anchor allied security policies and reduce incentives for independent nuclear programs. South Korea and Japan have publicly restated opposition to acquiring weapons, while Saudi Arabia’s July 2026 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States focuses on power generation under bilateral safeguards rather than weaponization. No ally has initiated a breakout from the NPT or secured delivery systems in the resolution window. Ongoing trilateral US-Japan-ROK coordination and NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements further reinforce reliance on existing umbrellas. These factors sustain trader consensus that acquisition remains structurally and diplomatically improbable before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Ринок відкрито: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Обсяг
$189,146Дата завершення
Dec 31, 2026Ринок відкрито
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed by Trump administration officials in early 2026, continue to anchor allied security policies and reduce incentives for independent nuclear programs. South Korea and Japan have publicly restated opposition to acquiring weapons, while Saudi Arabia’s July 2026 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States focuses on power generation under bilateral safeguards rather than weaponization. No ally has initiated a breakout from the NPT or secured delivery systems in the resolution window. Ongoing trilateral US-Japan-ROK coordination and NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements further reinforce reliance on existing umbrellas. These factors sustain trader consensus that acquisition remains structurally and diplomatically improbable before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Обсяг
$189,146Дата завершення
Dec 31, 2026Ринок відкрито
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed by Trump administration officials in early 2026, continue to anchor allied security policies and reduce incentives for independent nuclear programs. South Korea and Japan have publicly restated opposition to acquiring weapons, while Saudi Arabia’s July 2026 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States focuses on power generation under bilateral safeguards rather than weaponization. No ally has initiated a breakout from the NPT or secured delivery systems in the resolution window. Ongoing trilateral US-Japan-ROK coordination and NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements further reinforce reliance on existing umbrellas. These factors sustain trader consensus that acquisition remains structurally and diplomatically improbable before 2027.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
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