**Despite intensified U.S. sanctions, including a fuel blockade imposed in January 2026 after the ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, and resulting nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and projected economic contraction of 6-7 percent, Cuba’s Communist Party leadership under First Secretary Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through its security apparatus.** Scattered protests, including cacerolazos and isolated incidents such as the March attack on a party office in Morón, have not escalated into organized nationwide unrest capable of forcing regime change. Traders price the low 13 percent probability of collapse this year on the regime’s demonstrated resilience to external pressure, absence of a viable opposition structure, and lack of imminent internal breakdown as of mid-August, even amid the ongoing humanitarian and economic strain.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · UpdatedCuban regime falls in 2026?
Cuban regime falls in 2026?
13% chance
$1,605,532 Vol.
$1,605,532 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
13% chance
$1,605,532 Vol.
$1,605,532 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**Despite intensified U.S. sanctions, including a fuel blockade imposed in January 2026 after the ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, and resulting nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and projected economic contraction of 6-7 percent, Cuba’s Communist Party leadership under First Secretary Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through its security apparatus.** Scattered protests, including cacerolazos and isolated incidents such as the March attack on a party office in Morón, have not escalated into organized nationwide unrest capable of forcing regime change. Traders price the low 13 percent probability of collapse this year on the regime’s demonstrated resilience to external pressure, absence of a viable opposition structure, and lack of imminent internal breakdown as of mid-August, even amid the ongoing humanitarian and economic strain.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volume
$1,605,532End Date
Dec 31, 2026Market Opened
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**Despite intensified U.S. sanctions, including a fuel blockade imposed in January 2026 after the ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, and resulting nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and projected economic contraction of 6-7 percent, Cuba’s Communist Party leadership under First Secretary Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through its security apparatus.** Scattered protests, including cacerolazos and isolated incidents such as the March attack on a party office in Morón, have not escalated into organized nationwide unrest capable of forcing regime change. Traders price the low 13 percent probability of collapse this year on the regime’s demonstrated resilience to external pressure, absence of a viable opposition structure, and lack of imminent internal breakdown as of mid-August, even amid the ongoing humanitarian and economic strain.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$1,605,532End Date
Dec 31, 2026Market Opened
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Despite intensified U.S. sanctions, including a fuel blockade imposed in January 2026 after the ouster of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, and resulting nationwide blackouts, fuel shortages, and projected economic contraction of 6-7 percent, Cuba’s Communist Party leadership under First Secretary Miguel Díaz-Canel has retained control through its security apparatus.** Scattered protests, including cacerolazos and isolated incidents such as the March attack on a party office in Morón, have not escalated into organized nationwide unrest capable of forcing regime change. Traders price the low 13 percent probability of collapse this year on the regime’s demonstrated resilience to external pressure, absence of a viable opposition structure, and lack of imminent internal breakdown as of mid-August, even amid the ongoing humanitarian and economic strain.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · Updated
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