**Traders assign a roughly 5% chance ("Yes" at ~5.3%) that any US ally acquires nuclear weapons before 2027, reflecting the significant technical, diplomatic, and political barriers to rapid proliferation.** US allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia maintain advanced civilian nuclear programs and enrichment discussions, yet none have crossed into weaponization. Recent developments include the July 2026 US-Saudi 123 Agreement enabling civilian uranium enrichment under bilateral safeguards, alongside continued US-Iran nuclear talks and South Korean leadership statements reaffirming non-weaponization commitments despite domestic debates. These steps remain framed as energy cooperation rather than weapons pathways. NPT obligations, US extended deterrence guarantees, and export-control regimes further constrain timelines. Historical patterns show allies typically pursue hedging capabilities or enhanced conventional options rather than independent arsenals, and no verified announcements, tests, or policy shifts in 2025–2026 indicate an accelerated breakout. While enrichment access shortens theoretical pathways and regional security concerns persist, credible weaponization would require additional fissile material production, warhead design, delivery integration, and political decisions that traders view as improbable within the remaining months of 2026. Resolution hinges on confirmed possession or testing by a qualifying ally.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · ОбновленоДа
$209,398 Объем
$209,398 Объем
Да
$209,398 Объем
$209,398 Объем
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Открытие рынка: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Resolver
0x65070BE91...**Traders assign a roughly 5% chance ("Yes" at ~5.3%) that any US ally acquires nuclear weapons before 2027, reflecting the significant technical, diplomatic, and political barriers to rapid proliferation.** US allies such as South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia maintain advanced civilian nuclear programs and enrichment discussions, yet none have crossed into weaponization. Recent developments include the July 2026 US-Saudi 123 Agreement enabling civilian uranium enrichment under bilateral safeguards, alongside continued US-Iran nuclear talks and South Korean leadership statements reaffirming non-weaponization commitments despite domestic debates. These steps remain framed as energy cooperation rather than weapons pathways. NPT obligations, US extended deterrence guarantees, and export-control regimes further constrain timelines. Historical patterns show allies typically pursue hedging capabilities or enhanced conventional options rather than independent arsenals, and no verified announcements, tests, or policy shifts in 2025–2026 indicate an accelerated breakout. While enrichment access shortens theoretical pathways and regional security concerns persist, credible weaponization would require additional fissile material production, warhead design, delivery integration, and political decisions that traders view as improbable within the remaining months of 2026. Resolution hinges on confirmed possession or testing by a qualifying ally.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено



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