**Traders assign a 94.5% implied probability to “No” because U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee negotiations remain stalled over core territorial and enforcement issues.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv focused on reviving peace talks and an energy truce, yet produced no breakthrough on binding commitments. Ukrainian officials continue to reject U.S.-linked proposals that would require withdrawal from Donbas in exchange for guarantees, while Washington has signaled reluctance to station troops or extend NATO-style Article 5 protections. Ongoing discussions point toward possible trilateral talks in October and reliance on a European “coalition of the willing” plus U.S. over-the-horizon support, but these frameworks fall short of the formal bilateral agreement needed for market resolution by year-end. Congressional ratification would also be required, adding further procedural hurdles.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於6% 機率
$38,540 交易量
$38,540 交易量
2026-12-31
6% 機率
$38,540 交易量
$38,540 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders assign a 94.5% implied probability to “No” because U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee negotiations remain stalled over core territorial and enforcement issues.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv focused on reviving peace talks and an energy truce, yet produced no breakthrough on binding commitments. Ukrainian officials continue to reject U.S.-linked proposals that would require withdrawal from Donbas in exchange for guarantees, while Washington has signaled reluctance to station troops or extend NATO-style Article 5 protections. Ongoing discussions point toward possible trilateral talks in October and reliance on a European “coalition of the willing” plus U.S. over-the-horizon support, but these frameworks fall short of the formal bilateral agreement needed for market resolution by year-end. Congressional ratification would also be required, adding further procedural hurdles.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市場開放時間： May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
交易量
$38,540結束日期
2027-01-01市場開放時間
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETThis market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders assign a 94.5% implied probability to “No” because U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee negotiations remain stalled over core territorial and enforcement issues.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv focused on reviving peace talks and an energy truce, yet produced no breakthrough on binding commitments. Ukrainian officials continue to reject U.S.-linked proposals that would require withdrawal from Donbas in exchange for guarantees, while Washington has signaled reluctance to station troops or extend NATO-style Article 5 protections. Ongoing discussions point toward possible trilateral talks in October and reliance on a European “coalition of the willing” plus U.S. over-the-horizon support, but these frameworks fall short of the formal bilateral agreement needed for market resolution by year-end. Congressional ratification would also be required, adding further procedural hurdles.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$38,540結束日期
2027-01-01市場開放時間
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET**Traders assign a 94.5% implied probability to “No” because U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee negotiations remain stalled over core territorial and enforcement issues.** Recent September 2026 visits by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and Kyiv focused on reviving peace talks and an energy truce, yet produced no breakthrough on binding commitments. Ukrainian officials continue to reject U.S.-linked proposals that would require withdrawal from Donbas in exchange for guarantees, while Washington has signaled reluctance to station troops or extend NATO-style Article 5 protections. Ongoing discussions point toward possible trilateral talks in October and reliance on a European “coalition of the willing” plus U.S. over-the-horizon support, but these frameworks fall short of the formal bilateral agreement needed for market resolution by year-end. Congressional ratification would also be required, adding further procedural hurdles.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於
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