China’s coast guard has conducted expanded “law enforcement” patrols east of Taiwan since June 2026, including radio challenges to vessels and increased sightings of government ships, while PLA exercises emphasize joint blockade and control of sea lanes. Taiwan’s defense ministry’s September 2026 report described these moves as preparations to cut external routes yet noted Beijing still lacks full amphibious capability for invasion. Taipei responded with Han Kuang drills featuring anti-blockade escorts and resilience exercises, alongside record defense spending. No full quarantine or blockade has occurred through early September, and ongoing U.S.-China diplomatic contacts appear to have contained escalation. Traders therefore assign only a 5 percent chance of a blockade materializing in the final months of 2026, viewing current pressure as incremental gray-zone activity rather than imminent closure of ports or sea lanes.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于是
5% 概率
$343,400 交易量
$343,400 交易量
2026-12-31
是
5% 概率
$343,400 交易量
$343,400 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an aerial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.China’s coast guard has conducted expanded “law enforcement” patrols east of Taiwan since June 2026, including radio challenges to vessels and increased sightings of government ships, while PLA exercises emphasize joint blockade and control of sea lanes. Taiwan’s defense ministry’s September 2026 report described these moves as preparations to cut external routes yet noted Beijing still lacks full amphibious capability for invasion. Taipei responded with Han Kuang drills featuring anti-blockade escorts and resilience exercises, alongside record defense spending. No full quarantine or blockade has occurred through early September, and ongoing U.S.-China diplomatic contacts appear to have contained escalation. Traders therefore assign only a 5 percent chance of a blockade materializing in the final months of 2026, viewing current pressure as incremental gray-zone activity rather than imminent closure of ports or sea lanes.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an aerial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
市场开放时间： May 29, 2026, 9:10 AM ET
交易量
$343,400结束日期
2027-01-01市场开放时间
May 29, 2026, 9:10 AM ETThis market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an aerial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.China’s coast guard has conducted expanded “law enforcement” patrols east of Taiwan since June 2026, including radio challenges to vessels and increased sightings of government ships, while PLA exercises emphasize joint blockade and control of sea lanes. Taiwan’s defense ministry’s September 2026 report described these moves as preparations to cut external routes yet noted Beijing still lacks full amphibious capability for invasion. Taipei responded with Han Kuang drills featuring anti-blockade escorts and resilience exercises, alongside record defense spending. No full quarantine or blockade has occurred through early September, and ongoing U.S.-China diplomatic contacts appear to have contained escalation. Traders therefore assign only a 5 percent chance of a blockade materializing in the final months of 2026, viewing current pressure as incremental gray-zone activity rather than imminent closure of ports or sea lanes.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an aerial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$343,400结束日期
2027-01-01市场开放时间
May 29, 2026, 9:10 AM ETChina’s coast guard has conducted expanded “law enforcement” patrols east of Taiwan since June 2026, including radio challenges to vessels and increased sightings of government ships, while PLA exercises emphasize joint blockade and control of sea lanes. Taiwan’s defense ministry’s September 2026 report described these moves as preparations to cut external routes yet noted Beijing still lacks full amphibious capability for invasion. Taipei responded with Han Kuang drills featuring anti-blockade escorts and resilience exercises, alongside record defense spending. No full quarantine or blockade has occurred through early September, and ongoing U.S.-China diplomatic contacts appear to have contained escalation. Traders therefore assign only a 5 percent chance of a blockade materializing in the final months of 2026, viewing current pressure as incremental gray-zone activity rather than imminent closure of ports or sea lanes.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
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