Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89.1% implied probability against any US ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027, driven by formidable technical, diplomatic, and legal barriers under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which key candidates like South Korea, Japan, Poland, and Saudi Arabia adhere as non-nuclear-weapon states. Despite ongoing discussions amid threats from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran—highlighted in recent analyses of proliferation risks—no official announcements, fissile material breakthroughs, or NPT withdrawals have emerged in 2026. US extended deterrence commitments and bipartisan legislation, such as the March 2026 reintroduction of the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, reinforce nonproliferation pressures. Historical base rates show indigenous programs require 5–10 years, leaving scant time before resolution absent seismic shifts like alliance ruptures or covert transfers. The NPT Review Conference in late April underscores global restraint efforts.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourOui
NOUVEAU
NOUVEAU
31 déc. 2026
Oui
NOUVEAU
NOUVEAU
31 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89.1% implied probability against any US ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027, driven by formidable technical, diplomatic, and legal barriers under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which key candidates like South Korea, Japan, Poland, and Saudi Arabia adhere as non-nuclear-weapon states. Despite ongoing discussions amid threats from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran—highlighted in recent analyses of proliferation risks—no official announcements, fissile material breakthroughs, or NPT withdrawals have emerged in 2026. US extended deterrence commitments and bipartisan legislation, such as the March 2026 reintroduction of the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, reinforce nonproliferation pressures. Historical base rates show indigenous programs require 5–10 years, leaving scant time before resolution absent seismic shifts like alliance ruptures or covert transfers. The NPT Review Conference in late April underscores global restraint efforts.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Marché ouvert : Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volume
$6,747Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89.1% implied probability against any US ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027, driven by formidable technical, diplomatic, and legal barriers under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which key candidates like South Korea, Japan, Poland, and Saudi Arabia adhere as non-nuclear-weapon states. Despite ongoing discussions amid threats from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran—highlighted in recent analyses of proliferation risks—no official announcements, fissile material breakthroughs, or NPT withdrawals have emerged in 2026. US extended deterrence commitments and bipartisan legislation, such as the March 2026 reintroduction of the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, reinforce nonproliferation pressures. Historical base rates show indigenous programs require 5–10 years, leaving scant time before resolution absent seismic shifts like alliance ruptures or covert transfers. The NPT Review Conference in late April underscores global restraint efforts.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volume
$6,747Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89.1% implied probability against any US ally acquiring nuclear weapons before 2027, driven by formidable technical, diplomatic, and legal barriers under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which key candidates like South Korea, Japan, Poland, and Saudi Arabia adhere as non-nuclear-weapon states. Despite ongoing discussions amid threats from North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran—highlighted in recent analyses of proliferation risks—no official announcements, fissile material breakthroughs, or NPT withdrawals have emerged in 2026. US extended deterrence commitments and bipartisan legislation, such as the March 2026 reintroduction of the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, reinforce nonproliferation pressures. Historical base rates show indigenous programs require 5–10 years, leaving scant time before resolution absent seismic shifts like alliance ruptures or covert transfers. The NPT Review Conference in late April underscores global restraint efforts.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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