Recent diplomatic efforts, including September 2026 talks in Kyiv led by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have advanced discussions on winter aid packages, resumed peace negotiations, and post-war security arrangements tied to a broader settlement. However, major unresolved issues persist around territorial concessions, Russian objections to Western-backed guarantees, and the absence of a finalized ceasefire framework. Earlier 2026 proposals for U.S. commitments, including references to 15-year arrangements linked to peace plans, remain conditional on agreements that have not materialized amid ongoing stalemates. Traders assign a 94% probability to "No" because formal U.S. agreement on binding security guarantees—distinct from existing bilateral pacts or monitoring mechanisms—faces significant procedural and geopolitical barriers before year-end.
Ringkasan eksperimental yang dihasilkan AI dengan referensi data Polymarket. Ini bukan saran trading dan tidak berperan dalam bagaimana pasar ini diselesaikan. · DiperbaruiU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
6% peluang
$38,078 Vol.
$38,078 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
6% peluang
$38,078 Vol.
$38,078 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Recent diplomatic efforts, including September 2026 talks in Kyiv led by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have advanced discussions on winter aid packages, resumed peace negotiations, and post-war security arrangements tied to a broader settlement. However, major unresolved issues persist around territorial concessions, Russian objections to Western-backed guarantees, and the absence of a finalized ceasefire framework. Earlier 2026 proposals for U.S. commitments, including references to 15-year arrangements linked to peace plans, remain conditional on agreements that have not materialized amid ongoing stalemates. Traders assign a 94% probability to "No" because formal U.S. agreement on binding security guarantees—distinct from existing bilateral pacts or monitoring mechanisms—faces significant procedural and geopolitical barriers before year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Pasar Dibuka: May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
Volume
$38,078Tanggal Berakhir
Jan 1, 2027Pasar Dibuka
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Recent diplomatic efforts, including September 2026 talks in Kyiv led by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have advanced discussions on winter aid packages, resumed peace negotiations, and post-war security arrangements tied to a broader settlement. However, major unresolved issues persist around territorial concessions, Russian objections to Western-backed guarantees, and the absence of a finalized ceasefire framework. Earlier 2026 proposals for U.S. commitments, including references to 15-year arrangements linked to peace plans, remain conditional on agreements that have not materialized amid ongoing stalemates. Traders assign a 94% probability to "No" because formal U.S. agreement on binding security guarantees—distinct from existing bilateral pacts or monitoring mechanisms—faces significant procedural and geopolitical barriers before year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$38,078Tanggal Berakhir
Jan 1, 2027Pasar Dibuka
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Recent diplomatic efforts, including September 2026 talks in Kyiv led by U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have advanced discussions on winter aid packages, resumed peace negotiations, and post-war security arrangements tied to a broader settlement. However, major unresolved issues persist around territorial concessions, Russian objections to Western-backed guarantees, and the absence of a finalized ceasefire framework. Earlier 2026 proposals for U.S. commitments, including references to 15-year arrangements linked to peace plans, remain conditional on agreements that have not materialized amid ongoing stalemates. Traders assign a 94% probability to "No" because formal U.S. agreement on binding security guarantees—distinct from existing bilateral pacts or monitoring mechanisms—faces significant procedural and geopolitical barriers before year-end.
Ringkasan eksperimental yang dihasilkan AI dengan referensi data Polymarket. Ini bukan saran trading dan tidak berperan dalam bagaimana pasar ini diselesaikan. · Diperbarui
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