**Ongoing U.S.-mediated peace talks between Ukraine and Russia have not produced a finalized bilateral security guarantee framework by mid-September 2026, with major obstacles persisting on territorial concessions, guarantee duration, and enforcement mechanisms.** U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Russian and Ukrainian leaders in early September to revive negotiations, proposing an energy-site truce as an initial de-escalation step ahead of potential trilateral talks in October. Any U.S. security commitments discussed—modeled on Article 5-style assurances but conditional on a ceasefire—require congressional ratification and alignment with a broader settlement that Russia has yet to endorse. These procedural and substantive hurdles, combined with the short timeline to December 31, underpin traders’ strong consensus against an agreement materializing on schedule.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · AggiornatoU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
6% probabilità
$38,540 Vol.
$38,540 Vol.
31 dic 2026
6% probabilità
$38,540 Vol.
$38,540 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Ongoing U.S.-mediated peace talks between Ukraine and Russia have not produced a finalized bilateral security guarantee framework by mid-September 2026, with major obstacles persisting on territorial concessions, guarantee duration, and enforcement mechanisms.**
U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Russian and Ukrainian leaders in early September to revive negotiations, proposing an energy-site truce as an initial de-escalation step ahead of potential trilateral talks in October. Any U.S. security commitments discussed—modeled on Article 5-style assurances but conditional on a ceasefire—require congressional ratification and alignment with a broader settlement that Russia has yet to endorse. These procedural and substantive hurdles, combined with the short timeline to December 31, underpin traders’ strong consensus against an agreement materializing on schedule.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercato aperto: May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
Volume
$38,540Data di fine
1 gen 2027Mercato aperto
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETRisolutore
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Ongoing U.S.-mediated peace talks between Ukraine and Russia have not produced a finalized bilateral security guarantee framework by mid-September 2026, with major obstacles persisting on territorial concessions, guarantee duration, and enforcement mechanisms.**
U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Russian and Ukrainian leaders in early September to revive negotiations, proposing an energy-site truce as an initial de-escalation step ahead of potential trilateral talks in October. Any U.S. security commitments discussed—modeled on Article 5-style assurances but conditional on a ceasefire—require congressional ratification and alignment with a broader settlement that Russia has yet to endorse. These procedural and substantive hurdles, combined with the short timeline to December 31, underpin traders’ strong consensus against an agreement materializing on schedule.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$38,540Data di fine
1 gen 2027Mercato aperto
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETRisolutore
0x65070BE91...**Ongoing U.S.-mediated peace talks between Ukraine and Russia have not produced a finalized bilateral security guarantee framework by mid-September 2026, with major obstacles persisting on territorial concessions, guarantee duration, and enforcement mechanisms.** U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Russian and Ukrainian leaders in early September to revive negotiations, proposing an energy-site truce as an initial de-escalation step ahead of potential trilateral talks in October. Any U.S. security commitments discussed—modeled on Article 5-style assurances but conditional on a ceasefire—require congressional ratification and alignment with a broader settlement that Russia has yet to endorse. These procedural and substantive hurdles, combined with the short timeline to December 31, underpin traders’ strong consensus against an agreement materializing on schedule.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato
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