Traders assign a 93% probability to no military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, troop concentrations, or official directives signaling imminent offensive operations across the Taiwan Strait. Routine PLA live-fire drills, maritime patrols, and blockade simulations—such as those conducted in July and December 2025—align with established patterns of gray-zone pressure rather than invasion preparation. Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises, featuring expanded reservist call-ups and resilience testing for supply lines and communications, underscore defensive adaptation without escalating to open conflict. Internal PLA leadership disruptions and Taiwan’s accelerated drone and asymmetric capabilities further support the current trader consensus reflected in the odds. While miscalculation during exercises or sudden diplomatic shifts remain possible, no developments in the past year indicate these risks have risen substantially within the limited timeframe.
สรุปจาก AI ทดลองที่อ้างอิงข้อมูลจาก Polymarket ไม่ใช่คำแนะนำในการเทรดและไม่มีผลต่อการตัดสินตลาดนี้ · อัปเดตแล้วใช่
7% โอกาส
$3,213,788 ปริมาณ
$3,213,788 ปริมาณ
Dec 31, 2026
ใช่
7% โอกาส
$3,213,788 ปริมาณ
$3,213,788 ปริมาณ
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a 93% probability to no military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, troop concentrations, or official directives signaling imminent offensive operations across the Taiwan Strait. Routine PLA live-fire drills, maritime patrols, and blockade simulations—such as those conducted in July and December 2025—align with established patterns of gray-zone pressure rather than invasion preparation. Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises, featuring expanded reservist call-ups and resilience testing for supply lines and communications, underscore defensive adaptation without escalating to open conflict. Internal PLA leadership disruptions and Taiwan’s accelerated drone and asymmetric capabilities further support the current trader consensus reflected in the odds. While miscalculation during exercises or sudden diplomatic shifts remain possible, no developments in the past year indicate these risks have risen substantially within the limited timeframe.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ: Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ET
ปริมาณการซื้อขาย
$3,213,788วันสิ้นสุด
Dec 31, 2026ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a 93% probability to no military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, troop concentrations, or official directives signaling imminent offensive operations across the Taiwan Strait. Routine PLA live-fire drills, maritime patrols, and blockade simulations—such as those conducted in July and December 2025—align with established patterns of gray-zone pressure rather than invasion preparation. Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises, featuring expanded reservist call-ups and resilience testing for supply lines and communications, underscore defensive adaptation without escalating to open conflict. Internal PLA leadership disruptions and Taiwan’s accelerated drone and asymmetric capabilities further support the current trader consensus reflected in the odds. While miscalculation during exercises or sudden diplomatic shifts remain possible, no developments in the past year indicate these risks have risen substantially within the limited timeframe.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
ปริมาณการซื้อขาย
$3,213,788วันสิ้นสุด
Dec 31, 2026ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Traders assign a 93% probability to no military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, troop concentrations, or official directives signaling imminent offensive operations across the Taiwan Strait. Routine PLA live-fire drills, maritime patrols, and blockade simulations—such as those conducted in July and December 2025—align with established patterns of gray-zone pressure rather than invasion preparation. Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises, featuring expanded reservist call-ups and resilience testing for supply lines and communications, underscore defensive adaptation without escalating to open conflict. Internal PLA leadership disruptions and Taiwan’s accelerated drone and asymmetric capabilities further support the current trader consensus reflected in the odds. While miscalculation during exercises or sudden diplomatic shifts remain possible, no developments in the past year indicate these risks have risen substantially within the limited timeframe.
สรุปจาก AI ทดลองที่อ้างอิงข้อมูลจาก Polymarket ไม่ใช่คำแนะนำในการเทรดและไม่มีผลต่อการตัดสินตลาดนี้ · อัปเดตแล้ว
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