The Islamic Republic has demonstrated institutional resilience following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli military campaign, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and subsequent waves of protests that security forces suppressed through mass arrests, executions, and internet restrictions without significant defections. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains cohesion and control over key levers of power, enabling a leadership transition while preventing fragmentation or nationwide uprisings in the intervening months. Traders assign a 98.5% probability to “No” given the short window to September 30 and the absence of verified indicators—such as coordinated elite splits or sustained popular mobilization—that would alter the trajectory. Realistic scenarios that could still shift the outcome remain low-probability events like sudden high-level military defections or a rapid, coordinated domestic challenge before the deadline.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · AtualizadoO regime iraniano cairá até 30 de setembro?
Sim
$1,685,393 Vol.
$1,685,393 Vol.
Sim
$1,685,393 Vol.
$1,685,393 Vol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado Aberto: Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Islamic Republic has demonstrated institutional resilience following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli military campaign, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and subsequent waves of protests that security forces suppressed through mass arrests, executions, and internet restrictions without significant defections. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains cohesion and control over key levers of power, enabling a leadership transition while preventing fragmentation or nationwide uprisings in the intervening months. Traders assign a 98.5% probability to “No” given the short window to September 30 and the absence of verified indicators—such as coordinated elite splits or sustained popular mobilization—that would alter the trajectory. Realistic scenarios that could still shift the outcome remain low-probability events like sudden high-level military defections or a rapid, coordinated domestic challenge before the deadline.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado


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