The Iranian regime's survival through the February–May 2026 U.S.-Israeli military campaign, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and targeted nuclear and military infrastructure, combined with the containment of late-2025/early-2026 nationwide protests over economic collapse and currency devaluation, underpins the near-certain trader consensus against regime change by September 30. Security institutions remained cohesive with no large-scale defections, leadership transitioned rapidly under Mojtaba Khamenei, and authorities suppressed unrest via crackdowns, arrests, and internet restrictions. Persistent economic pressures and regional tensions continue, yet these have not produced organized opposition capable of overthrowing the system in the narrow window remaining. Late escalations in protests, elite fractures, or renewed external strikes remain the main variables that could shift probabilities, though recent patterns show limited immediate risk.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · ОновленоWill the Iranian regime fall by September 30?
$1,618,581 Обс.
$1,618,581 Обс.
$1,618,581 Обс.
$1,618,581 Обс.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Ринок відкрито: Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's survival through the February–May 2026 U.S.-Israeli military campaign, which killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and targeted nuclear and military infrastructure, combined with the containment of late-2025/early-2026 nationwide protests over economic collapse and currency devaluation, underpins the near-certain trader consensus against regime change by September 30. Security institutions remained cohesive with no large-scale defections, leadership transitioned rapidly under Mojtaba Khamenei, and authorities suppressed unrest via crackdowns, arrests, and internet restrictions. Persistent economic pressures and regional tensions continue, yet these have not produced organized opposition capable of overthrowing the system in the narrow window remaining. Late escalations in protests, elite fractures, or renewed external strikes remain the main variables that could shift probabilities, though recent patterns show limited immediate risk.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено


Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Часті запитання