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icon for U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
Geopolitik·Ukraine

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?

icon for U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
Geopolitik·Ukraine

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?

Jan. 1, 2027

Jan. 1, 2027

6% Chance
Polymarket

$38,078 Vol.

6% Chance
Polymarket

$38,078 Vol.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a 94% probability to “No” on a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, reflecting ongoing but inconclusive negotiations. As of mid-September 2026, U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have conducted shuttle diplomacy with Moscow and Kyiv, while Ukrainian officials anticipate trilateral talks in October focused on ceasefire monitoring, Black Sea navigation, and layered defense arrangements rather than a binding U.S. mutual-defense commitment. Discussions emphasize European-led contributions, congressional ratification hurdles, and unresolved territorial issues that continue to block a formal U.S. pact. Historical patterns of phased agreements and the absence of any announced timeline for a U.S.-Ukraine deal by year-end reinforce the market’s assessment that such a guarantee remains unlikely within the resolution window.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$38,078
Enddatum
1. Jan. 2027
Markt eröffnet
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET

Abwickler

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a 94% probability to “No” on a U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, reflecting ongoing but inconclusive negotiations. As of mid-September 2026, U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have conducted shuttle diplomacy with Moscow and Kyiv, while Ukrainian officials anticipate trilateral talks in October focused on ceasefire monitoring, Black Sea navigation, and layered defense arrangements rather than a binding U.S. mutual-defense commitment. Discussions emphasize European-led contributions, congressional ratification hurdles, and unresolved territorial issues that continue to block a formal U.S. pact. Historical patterns of phased agreements and the absence of any announced timeline for a U.S.-Ukraine deal by year-end reinforce the market’s assessment that such a guarantee remains unlikely within the resolution window.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$38,078
Enddatum
1. Jan. 2027
Markt eröffnet
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET

Abwickler

0x65070BE91...

Verwandte

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Vorsicht bei externen Links.

Häufig gestellte Fragen

„U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?" ist ein Prognosemarkt auf Polymarket, auf dem Händler „Ja"- oder „Nein"-Anteile kaufen und verkaufen, je nachdem, ob sie glauben, dass dieses Ereignis eintreten wird. Die aktuelle Wahrscheinlichkeit laut Community liegt bei 6% für „Yes". Wird „Ja" beispielsweise bei 6¢ gehandelt, schätzt der Markt die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Eintretens auf 6%. Diese Quoten ändern sich laufend, wenn Händler auf neue Entwicklungen und Informationen reagieren. Anteile am richtigen Ergebnis können bei Marktauflösung für jeweils $1 eingelöst werden.

Stand heute hat „U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?" ein Gesamthandelsvolumen von $38.1K generiert, seit der Markt am May 28, 2026 gestartet wurde. Dieses Aktivitätsniveau spiegelt starkes Engagement der Polymarket-Community wider und stellt sicher, dass die aktuellen Quoten von einem breiten Pool an Marktteilnehmern geprägt werden. Sie können Live-Preisbewegungen verfolgen und direkt auf dieser Seite auf jedes Ergebnis handeln.

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Die aktuelle Wahrscheinlichkeit für „U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?" liegt bei 6% für „Yes". Das bedeutet, die Polymarket-Community glaubt derzeit, dass eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 6% besteht, dass dieses Ereignis eintritt. Diese Quoten werden in Echtzeit auf Basis tatsächlicher Handelsgeschäfte aktualisiert und liefern ein ständig aktualisiertes Signal dessen, was der Markt erwartet.

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