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icon for U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
Politics·Trump-Zelenskyy

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?

icon for U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
Politics·Trump-Zelenskyy

U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?

Jun 30

Dec 31

Jun 30

Dec 31

<1% chance
Polymarket

$171,147 Vol.

<1% chance
Polymarket

$171,147 Vol.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$171,147
End Date
Jun 30, 2026
Market Opened
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Negotiations over a formal U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine remain stalled in mid-June 2026, with the Trump administration conditioning any binding bilateral commitment on a broader peace settlement that includes Ukrainian territorial concessions such as in the Donbas region. Substantive differences persist over guarantee duration, enforcement mechanisms, and congressional ratification requirements, preventing finalization ahead of the June 30 deadline. Earlier Ukrainian statements describing draft texts as ready have not produced a signed agreement or scheduled signing, as talks stay linked to overall war termination. Traders assign near-certain probability to no agreement by the cutoff due to these procedural and substantive hurdles. A late diplomatic breakthrough or surprise announcement could still alter the outcome before the resolution window closes.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$171,147
End Date
Dec 31, 2026
Market Opened
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.

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Frequently Asked Questions

"U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?" is a prediction market on Polymarket where traders buy and sell "Yes" or "No" shares based on whether they believe this event will happen. The current crowd-sourced probability is 0% for "Yes." For example, if "Yes" is priced at 0¢, the market collectively assigns a 0% chance that this event will occur. These odds shift continuously as traders react to new developments and information. Shares in the correct outcome are redeemable for $1 each upon market resolution.

As of today, "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?" has generated $171.1K in total trading volume since the market launched on Dec 28, 2025. This level of trading activity reflects strong engagement from the Polymarket community and helps ensure that the current odds are informed by a deep pool of market participants. You can track live price movements and trade on any outcome directly on this page.

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The current probability for "U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?" is 0% for "Yes." This means the Polymarket crowd currently believes there is a 0% chance that this event will occur. These odds update in real-time based on actual trades, providing a continuously updated signal of what the market expects to happen.

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