Trader consensus on Polymarket assigns a 95.5% implied probability to no Chinese invasion of Taiwan by September 30, 2026, reflecting U.S. intelligence community's March 2026 assessment that Beijing lacks plans for a 2027 assault and shows no observable large-scale invasion preparations like amphibious rehearsals or troop mobilizations. Recent PLA activities remain routine, including April warships near Penghu islands and seasonal declines in air defense identification zone incursions, amid ongoing deterrence from U.S.-allied exercises such as Balikatan. High economic interdependence and wargame projections of massive losses for all sides reinforce caution. Realistic shifts could stem from accidental escalations in the Taiwan Strait, diplomatic breakdowns like recent Xi-Trump warnings, or sudden policy reversals, though structural barriers persist.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · ОбновленоДа
$461,403 Объем
$461,403 Объем
Да
$461,403 Объем
$461,403 Объем
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Открытие рынка: Mar 17, 2026, 7:25 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket assigns a 95.5% implied probability to no Chinese invasion of Taiwan by September 30, 2026, reflecting U.S. intelligence community's March 2026 assessment that Beijing lacks plans for a 2027 assault and shows no observable large-scale invasion preparations like amphibious rehearsals or troop mobilizations. Recent PLA activities remain routine, including April warships near Penghu islands and seasonal declines in air defense identification zone incursions, amid ongoing deterrence from U.S.-allied exercises such as Balikatan. High economic interdependence and wargame projections of massive losses for all sides reinforce caution. Realistic shifts could stem from accidental escalations in the Taiwan Strait, diplomatic breakdowns like recent Xi-Trump warnings, or sudden policy reversals, though structural barriers persist.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
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Не доверяй внешним ссылкам.
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