Traders assign a 92.8% implied probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command restructuring required for a major operation in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises testing reservist call-ups, arms production relocation, and communications resilience, alongside China’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait and reduced PLAAF activity near the island earlier in the year. U.S. assessments highlight ongoing PLA readiness gaps and high costs from potential allied intervention, while Beijing sustains diplomatic outreach to Taiwan’s opposition and grey-zone coercion short of open conflict. Late shifts remain possible from miscalculation during exercises or rapid policy changes, though timing and structural barriers limit those risks before year-end.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · ОбновленоДа
7% вероятность
$3,218,710 Объем
$3,218,710 Объем
31 дек. 2026 г.
Да
7% вероятность
$3,218,710 Объем
$3,218,710 Объем
31 дек. 2026 г.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a 92.8% implied probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command restructuring required for a major operation in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises testing reservist call-ups, arms production relocation, and communications resilience, alongside China’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait and reduced PLAAF activity near the island earlier in the year. U.S. assessments highlight ongoing PLA readiness gaps and high costs from potential allied intervention, while Beijing sustains diplomatic outreach to Taiwan’s opposition and grey-zone coercion short of open conflict. Late shifts remain possible from miscalculation during exercises or rapid policy changes, though timing and structural barriers limit those risks before year-end.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Открытие рынка: Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ET
Объем
$3,218,710Дата окончания
31 дек. 2026 г.Открытие рынка
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a 92.8% implied probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command restructuring required for a major operation in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises testing reservist call-ups, arms production relocation, and communications resilience, alongside China’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait and reduced PLAAF activity near the island earlier in the year. U.S. assessments highlight ongoing PLA readiness gaps and high costs from potential allied intervention, while Beijing sustains diplomatic outreach to Taiwan’s opposition and grey-zone coercion short of open conflict. Late shifts remain possible from miscalculation during exercises or rapid policy changes, though timing and structural barriers limit those risks before year-end.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Объем
$3,218,710Дата окончания
31 дек. 2026 г.Открытие рынка
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Traders assign a 92.8% implied probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 primarily because Beijing has shown no visible large-scale amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command restructuring required for a major operation in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include Taiwan’s August 2026 Han Kuang exercises testing reservist call-ups, arms production relocation, and communications resilience, alongside China’s July live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait and reduced PLAAF activity near the island earlier in the year. U.S. assessments highlight ongoing PLA readiness gaps and high costs from potential allied intervention, while Beijing sustains diplomatic outreach to Taiwan’s opposition and grey-zone coercion short of open conflict. Late shifts remain possible from miscalculation during exercises or rapid policy changes, though timing and structural barriers limit those risks before year-end.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
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Не доверяй внешним ссылкам.
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