Traders assign a high probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 due to the absence of visible large-scale PLA amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command shifts required for an invasion in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include routine live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait in July and Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang exercises in August testing reservist mobilization, drone procurement, and supply resilience, yet both remain at levels consistent with ongoing coercion rather than imminent conflict. PLA Air Defense Identification Zone incursions have declined markedly since early 2026, while Beijing continues short-of-war pressure through coast guard operations and diplomatic signaling. These patterns align with historical precedents for managed cross-strait tensions and reflect trader assessments of structural barriers, including expected intervention costs and resolution timelines through December 2026.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日はい
$3,217,621 Vol.
$3,217,621 Vol.
はい
$3,217,621 Vol.
$3,217,621 Vol.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
マーケット開始日: Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Traders assign a high probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 due to the absence of visible large-scale PLA amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command shifts required for an invasion in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include routine live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait in July and Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang exercises in August testing reservist mobilization, drone procurement, and supply resilience, yet both remain at levels consistent with ongoing coercion rather than imminent conflict. PLA Air Defense Identification Zone incursions have declined markedly since early 2026, while Beijing continues short-of-war pressure through coast guard operations and diplomatic signaling. These patterns align with historical precedents for managed cross-strait tensions and reflect trader assessments of structural barriers, including expected intervention costs and resolution timelines through December 2026.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日



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