The Islamic Republic’s multilayered security apparatus and elite cohesion have contained unrest following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and subsequent nationwide protests met with mass arrests and lethal force. Economic pressures, including inflation and internet restrictions, along with proxy setbacks have not produced defections in the military or IRGC or the decisive popular uprising needed for collapse. By mid-2026 authorities had reasserted control, and ongoing diplomatic exchanges over issues such as the Strait of Hormuz signal institutional continuity rather than fragmentation. Traders assign only a 2 percent chance of regime fall by September 30 because historical patterns of authoritarian durability in Iran require a tipping point—such as coordinated elite fracture or sustained, nationwide mobilization—that remains absent. A sudden cascade of security defections or renewed large-scale demonstrations triggered by fresh economic shocks could still shift probabilities, though both appear improbable within the narrow window.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日はい
$1,611,225 Vol.
$1,611,225 Vol.
はい
$1,611,225 Vol.
$1,611,225 Vol.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
マーケット開始日: Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Islamic Republic’s multilayered security apparatus and elite cohesion have contained unrest following the February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and subsequent nationwide protests met with mass arrests and lethal force. Economic pressures, including inflation and internet restrictions, along with proxy setbacks have not produced defections in the military or IRGC or the decisive popular uprising needed for collapse. By mid-2026 authorities had reasserted control, and ongoing diplomatic exchanges over issues such as the Strait of Hormuz signal institutional continuity rather than fragmentation. Traders assign only a 2 percent chance of regime fall by September 30 because historical patterns of authoritarian durability in Iran require a tipping point—such as coordinated elite fracture or sustained, nationwide mobilization—that remains absent. A sudden cascade of security defections or renewed large-scale demonstrations triggered by fresh economic shocks could still shift probabilities, though both appear improbable within the narrow window.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日


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