Traders assign a 96.4% implied probability to No because no European country has concluded a formal bilateral mutual defense treaty with Ukraine that meets the market’s binding criteria. Recent strategic partnership declarations, including Germany’s April 2026 agreement and Bulgaria’s March cooperation pact, have centered on military aid, training, and capacity building rather than creating obligations to defend Ukraine against future aggression. Multilateral efforts through the Coalition of the Willing and the EU’s €90 billion support package have advanced assistance without crossing into individual country commitments. Domestic political constraints in several capitals and the conditioning of deeper guarantees on progress in U.S.-facilitated peace talks further limit prospects ahead of the Ukraine Recovery Conference at the end of June. A last-minute bilateral treaty or sudden shift in a major European government’s position remains the only realistic path that could alter the current consensus.
สรุปจาก AI ทดลองที่อ้างอิงข้อมูลจาก Polymarket ไม่ใช่คำแนะนำในการเทรดและไม่มีผลต่อการตัดสินตลาดนี้ · อัปเดตแล้ว$123,404 ปริมาณ
$123,404 ปริมาณ
Jun 30, 2026
$123,404 ปริมาณ
$123,404 ปริมาณ
Jun 30, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.Traders assign a 96.4% implied probability to No because no European country has concluded a formal bilateral mutual defense treaty with Ukraine that meets the market’s binding criteria. Recent strategic partnership declarations, including Germany’s April 2026 agreement and Bulgaria’s March cooperation pact, have centered on military aid, training, and capacity building rather than creating obligations to defend Ukraine against future aggression. Multilateral efforts through the Coalition of the Willing and the EU’s €90 billion support package have advanced assistance without crossing into individual country commitments. Domestic political constraints in several capitals and the conditioning of deeper guarantees on progress in U.S.-facilitated peace talks further limit prospects ahead of the Ukraine Recovery Conference at the end of June. A last-minute bilateral treaty or sudden shift in a major European government’s position remains the only realistic path that could alter the current consensus.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ: Dec 28, 2025, 6:06 PM ET
ปริมาณการซื้อขาย
$123,404วันสิ้นสุด
Jun 30, 2026ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ
Dec 28, 2025, 6:06 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.Traders assign a 96.4% implied probability to No because no European country has concluded a formal bilateral mutual defense treaty with Ukraine that meets the market’s binding criteria. Recent strategic partnership declarations, including Germany’s April 2026 agreement and Bulgaria’s March cooperation pact, have centered on military aid, training, and capacity building rather than creating obligations to defend Ukraine against future aggression. Multilateral efforts through the Coalition of the Willing and the EU’s €90 billion support package have advanced assistance without crossing into individual country commitments. Domestic political constraints in several capitals and the conditioning of deeper guarantees on progress in U.S.-facilitated peace talks further limit prospects ahead of the Ukraine Recovery Conference at the end of June. A last-minute bilateral treaty or sudden shift in a major European government’s position remains the only realistic path that could alter the current consensus.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
ปริมาณการซื้อขาย
$123,404วันสิ้นสุด
Jun 30, 2026ตลาดเปิดเมื่อ
Dec 28, 2025, 6:06 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Traders assign a 96.4% implied probability to No because no European country has concluded a formal bilateral mutual defense treaty with Ukraine that meets the market’s binding criteria. Recent strategic partnership declarations, including Germany’s April 2026 agreement and Bulgaria’s March cooperation pact, have centered on military aid, training, and capacity building rather than creating obligations to defend Ukraine against future aggression. Multilateral efforts through the Coalition of the Willing and the EU’s €90 billion support package have advanced assistance without crossing into individual country commitments. Domestic political constraints in several capitals and the conditioning of deeper guarantees on progress in U.S.-facilitated peace talks further limit prospects ahead of the Ukraine Recovery Conference at the end of June. A last-minute bilateral treaty or sudden shift in a major European government’s position remains the only realistic path that could alter the current consensus.
สรุปจาก AI ทดลองที่อ้างอิงข้อมูลจาก Polymarket ไม่ใช่คำแนะนำในการเทรดและไม่มีผลต่อการตัดสินตลาดนี้ · อัปเดตแล้ว
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