The Iranian regime's rapid succession process and institutional continuity after the February 2026 assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have reinforced trader expectations that it will endure beyond 2026. Mojtaba Khamenei was installed as successor within days, with security forces, military commands, and clerical bodies renewing pledges of allegiance, while nationwide protests from late 2025 into early 2026 were contained through arrests, internet restrictions, and lethal force without triggering widespread defections or collapse. Ongoing U.S.-Iran negotiations and limited strikes through April have produced no verifiable internal fractures or external intervention sufficient to upend the theocratic structure, aligning with the 83.5 percent "No" probability that reflects the market's assessment of the regime's historical adaptability under sustained external and domestic pressure.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · ОновленоТак
$17,911,637 Обс.
$17,911,637 Обс.
Так
$17,911,637 Обс.
$17,911,637 Обс.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Ринок відкрито: Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's rapid succession process and institutional continuity after the February 2026 assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have reinforced trader expectations that it will endure beyond 2026. Mojtaba Khamenei was installed as successor within days, with security forces, military commands, and clerical bodies renewing pledges of allegiance, while nationwide protests from late 2025 into early 2026 were contained through arrests, internet restrictions, and lethal force without triggering widespread defections or collapse. Ongoing U.S.-Iran negotiations and limited strikes through April have produced no verifiable internal fractures or external intervention sufficient to upend the theocratic structure, aligning with the 83.5 percent "No" probability that reflects the market's assessment of the regime's historical adaptability under sustained external and domestic pressure.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Часті запитання