Recent U.S.-China diplomatic engagement, including the May 14 Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, has reinforced trader expectations against an imminent blockade, as both sides emphasized trade continuity while Xi flagged Taiwan risks without issuing new military ultimatums. U.S. intelligence assessments through early 2026 continue to find no fixed PRC timeline or readiness for coercive action by June, consistent with the absence of large-scale PLA exercises or major escalations in the past month. Taiwan’s ongoing defense budget increases, joint drills for supply-line security, and coast guard responses to gray-zone incursions further support deterrence without provoking a crossing of the threshold. This combination of verified diplomatic stabilization and capability gaps underpins the 97.8 percent implied probability for no blockade. Sudden shifts could still arise from unforeseen incidents, such as intensified cross-strait collisions or abrupt leadership signals, though current trajectories show no such catalysts.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于是
$1,406,417 交易量
$1,406,417 交易量
2026-06-30
是
$1,406,417 交易量
$1,406,417 交易量
2026-06-30
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an arial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Recent U.S.-China diplomatic engagement, including the May 14 Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, has reinforced trader expectations against an imminent blockade, as both sides emphasized trade continuity while Xi flagged Taiwan risks without issuing new military ultimatums. U.S. intelligence assessments through early 2026 continue to find no fixed PRC timeline or readiness for coercive action by June, consistent with the absence of large-scale PLA exercises or major escalations in the past month. Taiwan’s ongoing defense budget increases, joint drills for supply-line security, and coast guard responses to gray-zone incursions further support deterrence without provoking a crossing of the threshold. This combination of verified diplomatic stabilization and capability gaps underpins the 97.8 percent implied probability for no blockade. Sudden shifts could still arise from unforeseen incidents, such as intensified cross-strait collisions or abrupt leadership signals, though current trajectories show no such catalysts.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an arial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
市场开放时间： Sep 19, 2025, 3:09 PM ET
交易量
$1,406,417结束日期
2026-06-30市场开放时间
Sep 19, 2025, 3:09 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an arial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Recent U.S.-China diplomatic engagement, including the May 14 Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, has reinforced trader expectations against an imminent blockade, as both sides emphasized trade continuity while Xi flagged Taiwan risks without issuing new military ultimatums. U.S. intelligence assessments through early 2026 continue to find no fixed PRC timeline or readiness for coercive action by June, consistent with the absence of large-scale PLA exercises or major escalations in the past month. Taiwan’s ongoing defense budget increases, joint drills for supply-line security, and coast guard responses to gray-zone incursions further support deterrence without provoking a crossing of the threshold. This combination of verified diplomatic stabilization and capability gaps underpins the 97.8 percent implied probability for no blockade. Sudden shifts could still arise from unforeseen incidents, such as intensified cross-strait collisions or abrupt leadership signals, though current trajectories show no such catalysts.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China (People's Republic of China) announces it has established or otherwise de facto establishes an arial or naval blockade for the territory of Taiwan (Republic of China) by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying blockade is:
- Prevents the normal ingress or egress of foreign commercial traffic to or from Taiwan Island’s main ports or airports by threat or use of force for ≥ 24 hours.
- Covers part or whole of the main island of Taiwan (Formosa).
- Is declared and enforced, de facto (e.g., it is established that China is blocking a significant portion of foreign commercial traffic, as described above, by a wide consensus of credible reporting regardless of whether China has issued a statement or not), or China-issued navigation/airspace prohibitions covering Taiwan's main island's approach lanes that are actively enforced so that most foreign commercial access is denied.
A qualifying blockade is not:
- Military or naval exercises or drills (established with warning areas or NOTAMs that do not actively stop third-country ships/aircraft and do not materially deny access).
- Purely economic or coercive measures (e.g., sanctions, customs delays, fishing bans, cyber/GPS jamming) without physical interdiction or enforced closure).
- Weather/accident-related closures or voluntary rerouting by operators absent PRC enforcement.
- Islet-only incidents that do not involve the main island of Taiwan.
- Seizure or inspection of a single vessel/aircraft by itself, unless part of an enforced pattern that denies access as defined above.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$1,406,417结束日期
2026-06-30市场开放时间
Sep 19, 2025, 3:09 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Recent U.S.-China diplomatic engagement, including the May 14 Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, has reinforced trader expectations against an imminent blockade, as both sides emphasized trade continuity while Xi flagged Taiwan risks without issuing new military ultimatums. U.S. intelligence assessments through early 2026 continue to find no fixed PRC timeline or readiness for coercive action by June, consistent with the absence of large-scale PLA exercises or major escalations in the past month. Taiwan’s ongoing defense budget increases, joint drills for supply-line security, and coast guard responses to gray-zone incursions further support deterrence without provoking a crossing of the threshold. This combination of verified diplomatic stabilization and capability gaps underpins the 97.8 percent implied probability for no blockade. Sudden shifts could still arise from unforeseen incidents, such as intensified cross-strait collisions or abrupt leadership signals, though current trajectories show no such catalysts.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
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