Traders assign a high probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 due to the absence of visible large-scale PLA amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command shifts required for an invasion in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include routine live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait in July and Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang exercises in August testing reservist mobilization, drone procurement, and supply resilience, yet both remain at levels consistent with ongoing coercion rather than imminent conflict. PLA Air Defense Identification Zone incursions have declined markedly since early 2026, while Beijing continues short-of-war pressure through coast guard operations and diplomatic signaling. These patterns align with historical precedents for managed cross-strait tensions and reflect trader assessments of structural barriers, including expected intervention costs and resolution timelines through December 2026.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · ОновленоТак
7% шанс
$3,217,621 Обс.
$3,217,621 Обс.
Dec 31, 2026
Так
7% шанс
$3,217,621 Обс.
$3,217,621 Обс.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a high probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 due to the absence of visible large-scale PLA amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command shifts required for an invasion in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include routine live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait in July and Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang exercises in August testing reservist mobilization, drone procurement, and supply resilience, yet both remain at levels consistent with ongoing coercion rather than imminent conflict. PLA Air Defense Identification Zone incursions have declined markedly since early 2026, while Beijing continues short-of-war pressure through coast guard operations and diplomatic signaling. These patterns align with historical precedents for managed cross-strait tensions and reflect trader assessments of structural barriers, including expected intervention costs and resolution timelines through December 2026.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Ринок відкрито: Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ET
Обсяг
$3,217,621Дата завершення
Dec 31, 2026Ринок відкрито
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Traders assign a high probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 due to the absence of visible large-scale PLA amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command shifts required for an invasion in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include routine live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait in July and Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang exercises in August testing reservist mobilization, drone procurement, and supply resilience, yet both remain at levels consistent with ongoing coercion rather than imminent conflict. PLA Air Defense Identification Zone incursions have declined markedly since early 2026, while Beijing continues short-of-war pressure through coast guard operations and diplomatic signaling. These patterns align with historical precedents for managed cross-strait tensions and reflect trader assessments of structural barriers, including expected intervention costs and resolution timelines through December 2026.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Обсяг
$3,217,621Дата завершення
Dec 31, 2026Ринок відкрито
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Traders assign a high probability against a China-Taiwan military clash before 2027 due to the absence of visible large-scale PLA amphibious mobilization, logistics buildup, or command shifts required for an invasion in the remaining months of 2026. Recent developments include routine live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait in July and Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang exercises in August testing reservist mobilization, drone procurement, and supply resilience, yet both remain at levels consistent with ongoing coercion rather than imminent conflict. PLA Air Defense Identification Zone incursions have declined markedly since early 2026, while Beijing continues short-of-war pressure through coast guard operations and diplomatic signaling. These patterns align with historical precedents for managed cross-strait tensions and reflect trader assessments of structural barriers, including expected intervention costs and resolution timelines through December 2026.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
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